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Summary
No country has achieved sustained economic development without substantial investment in human
capital.  Previous studies have shown the handsome returns to various forms of human capital
accumulation: basic education, research, training, learning-by-doing and capacity-building.  Yet
history also tells us that education by itself does not guarantee successful development.  Examples
include the former Soviet Bloc, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and the Indian states of Kerala and
West Bengal. The real question, then, is when and how education can bring high payoffs.
While theories suggested a strong causal link from education to growth, the empirical evidence has
not been unanimous and conclusive.  This paper focuses on two explanatory factors. First,  who
gets educated matters a great deal.  The distribution of education is a complex issue and not much
has been written about it.  In this paper we construct an asset allocation model that elucidates the
importance of the distribution of education for economic development.
Second, the impact of education on growth is greatly affected by the economic policy environment.
Policies determine what people can do with their education.  Reforms of trade, investment, labor
policies can increase the returns from education. Using panel data from 12 Asian and Latin
American countries for 1970 to 1994,  the paper investigates the relationship of education, policy
reforms, and economic growth. Our empirical results are promising.
First, the distribution of education matters. Unequal distribution of education tends to have a
negative impact on per capita income in most countries.  Moreover, controlling for human capital
distribution and the use of appropriate functional form specifications consistent with the asset
allocation model makes a difference for the effect of mean education on per capita income.
Controlling for education distribution leads to positive and significant effects of average education
on per capita income, while failure to do so leads to insignificant and even negative effects of
average education.
Second, the policy environment matters a great deal. Our results indicate that economic policies
that suppress market forces tend to dramatically reduce the impact of human capital on economic
growth.  Moreover, the economies in the sample are in a phase of diminishing growth as the stock
of physical capital increases relative to that of human capital.
3Investment in human capital can have little impact on growth unless people can use education in
competitive and open markets.  The larger and more competitive these markets are, the greater are
the prospects for using education and skills.  The policy environment could also help to induce
quality improvements in education and to calibrate the distribution of education to achieve the
greatest welfare improvements.
I. Issues and Evidence
Studies have shown the handsome returns to various forms of human capital accumulation: basic
education, research, training, learning-by-doing and capacity-building.   Education enriches
people’s understanding of themselves and the world.   It improves the quality of their lives and
leads to broad social benefits to individuals and society.  Education raises peoples’ productivity
and creativity and promotes entrepreneurship and technological advances, demonstrated in
countries from Malaysia to Bolivia to Ghana (World Bank 1991).
We also know that education alone does not guarantee sustainable economic growth. The
former Soviet Bloc attained universal literacy decades ago.  But because these countries were
closed to ideas and products from the outside, their economies stagnated. The Philippines, Sri
Lanka, and the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal have experienced periods of lackluster
growth even though their education levels outstripped those of countries and states that matched
them in other ways. The real question, then, is when and how education can bring high payoffs.
Using panel data from 12 countries from 1970 to 1994, this paper investigates the
relationship of education, policy reforms, and economic growth. We hope to shed light on the
importance of the distribution of education to economic growth and on how the interaction of
education and reforms facilitates economic and productivity growth. We draw on cross-country
experience to show how policy reforms bolster returns from education and to highlight the
conditions under which investment in both physical and human capital is likely to pay off.
The Education Puzzle
In the earlier neoclassical models,  education was not considered a major input for
production and hence was not included in growth models.1   In the 1960s mounting empirical
evidence stimulated the “human investment revolution in economic thought” (Bowman 1966).  The
seminal works of Schultz (1961) and Denison (1962, 1967) led to a series of growth accounting
studies pointing to education’s contribution to the unexplained residuals in the economic growth of
western economies.  Other studies looked at the impact of education on earnings or estimated
private rates of returns (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974).  A 1984 survey of growth accounting studies
covering 29 developing countries found estimates of education’s contribution to economic growth
ranging from less than 1 percent in Mexico to as high as 23 percent in Ghana (Psacharopoulos
1984).
                                                       
1 Arnold C. Harberger described this period in a recent paper, “Many, maybe even most, economists
expected that increments of output would be explained by increments of inputs, but when we took
our best shot we found that traditional inputs typically fell far short of explaining the observed output
growth....” “.. as the newly discovered residual loomed large in our professional thinking, our
discussion centered on two potential explanations: ‘human capital’ and ‘technical advance.’”
(Harberger, AER, 1998 p.1-2)
4In the late 1980s, as dissatisfaction with the neoclassical growth framework, endogenous
growth models began to emphasize the accumulation of human capital, which is not subject to
diminishing returns. In these models, growth is explained by endogenously driven technical change,
which may be brought about by a variety of factors: learning by doing (Romer 1986), spillover
effects of human capital formation (Lucas 1988), production externalities of public expenditure
(Barro 1990), and quality improvements through the invention of new products (Grossman and
Helpman 1991).
While these theories have incorporated human capital or education as an important input to
growth, empirical evidence is still far from unanimous and conclusive.  Numerous studies, some
using cross-country data, have investigated the relationship between formal education and
economic growth in developing countries. While many studies found that additional years of
education per person in the labor force increase real output or growth rates (World Bank 1991,
1993 for example), a few studies found that  human capital accumulation had a significant negative
or an insignificant impact on economic or productivity growth.
Using cross-country data from 91 countries, Pritchett (1996) found a large and significant
negative impact of human capital accumulation on productivity growth. Pritchett offered three
possible explanations: schooling creates no human capital,  the marginal returns to education are
falling rapidly where demand for educated labor is stagnant, and perverse institutional
environments have misdirected educated labor to activities that reduce economic growth. Islam
(1995) finds consistently negative and significant coefficients on the natural log of years of
schooling in panel estimates of the level of income.  This finding replicated with various panel and
GMM estimators in Hoeffler (1997).  Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Spiegel (1994) find a
negative effect for increased years of schooling using a standard growth accounting framework.
Spiegel (1994) shows that the negative effect is robust to the inclusion of a wide variety of
variables such as regional dummies, size of the middle class, political instability, share of
machinery investment, and inward orientation.
Lau, Jamison, and Louat (1991) estimated the Cobb-Douglas production function using
log-difference variables, employing panel data for 58 developing countries.  They investigated the
effects of education level in five regions and found that education had an estimated negative effect
in Africa and the Middle East and North Africa and insignificant effects in South Asia and Latin
America; only in East Asia was the effect positive and significant.   Jovanovic, Lach, and Lavy
(1992), using annual data on a different set of capital stocks and the NSD education data, find
similar negative coefficients for their sample of developing countries. The World Bank’s World
Development Report 1995 on labor issues also notes the lack of importance of education in
explaining aggregate growth (World Bank 1995, figure 2.4).  Using other proxies for human
capital, such as adult literacy and enrollment, gives similar results.  Behrman (1987) estimated a
production function using data from 68 developing countries, and found that literacy has a positive
effect on output in the level regressions while it has a significantly negative coefficient in the
differences regressions. Dasgupta and Weale (1992) find that changes in adult literacy are not
significantly correlated with changes in output.  Gregorio (199?) studied the growth experience of
12 Latin American countries and found enrollment indices have negative but insignificant
coefficients on growth.
So here is the puzzle: while theory suggests a strong causal link from education to growth,
the empirical evidence is neither unanimous nor conclusive.
5Three Potential Explanations
One common explanation for the puzzle is that measures of human capital often neglect the quality
of education, usually because of data limitations.  Much has been written lately about the
importance of quality.  For example, Hanushek and Kim (1995) find that test scores are positively
related to growth rates of real per capita GDP in cross-country regressions.  Barro and Lee (1997)
show that family inputs and school resources are closely related to student performance as
measured by internationally comparable test scores, repetition rates, and dropout rates.  Hanushek
(1995), Duraisamy et al (1998), and others, have also examined the importance of quality, so this
explanation is well studied and is not the focus of our study.
Rather, it focuses on two other explanations. First,  who gets educated matters a great
deal.  The distribution of education is a complex but little explored issue.  Based on development
experience in the past 30 years, we know that broad access to education is necessary for economic
growth.  We also sense that, given broad access, the deepening of education is also significantly
related to technological progress and industrial upgrading.  In Thailand, for example, the shortage
of skilled labor is a constraint of growth.  Using an asset allocation model to examine this issue, we
found that the distribution of education is important in the process of economic development.
Second, the impact of education on growth is greatly affected by the macroeconomic
policy environment of a country.  The policy environment determines what people can do with their
education.  Policy reforms to open up trade and investment and reduce distorted prices can greatly
increase the returns from formal education and enhance the impact of education on growth.  Using
a model incorporating the interaction of education, its distribution, and policy reforms we found
strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the interaction of education and policy reform
matters.
II. Where Education Worked or Did Not Work
Many developing countries have made significant progress in providing better access to education,
as evidenced by improved literacy and enrollment rates and higher quality and more equitable
distribution of educational services.  But the returns from investment in education vary a great
deal. In this section, we compare countries where education has worked to boost growth with those
where it has not.  Most striking in these comparisons across countries are the differences in
equality of education, the policy environment for education, and the impact on growth (table 1).2
This section highlights cases where the distribution of education was key to development, and cases
where the interaction of policy reform and education promoted economic growth.
Table 1. Social Progress in Selected Developing Countries
Economic indicators Education
                                                       
2 In this paper,  we employ a panel data set of 12 countries from 1970 to 1994 consisting of variables on
GDP per capita measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) and by constant dollars, physical capital
stock, labor, level of education of the labor force, and the distribution of education in the labor force,
terms of trade, and a few dummy variables. (See appendix I for data and methods).
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Country  1970-95 1980-95 Male Female 1993 1993 1992
East Asia
China 6.9 12.4 10 27 109 52 5.86
Korea, Rep. of 10 11.6 1 3 101 93 8.70
Malaysia 4 13.6 11 22 93 59 6.92
Philippines 0.6 5.3 5 6 111 79 8.34
Thailand 5.2 16.7 4 8 98 37 6.27
South Asia
India 2.4 6.5 35 62 105 - 4.01
Latin America
Brazil .. 6.3 17 17 111 43 4.95
Chile 1.8 7.3 5 5 98 70 7.69
Colombia 1.9 8.1 9 9 119 62 5.69
Mexico 0.9 13.0 8 13 112 58 7.12
Peru -1.1 2.4 6 17 119 65 7.48
Venezuela -1.1 1.0 8 10 96 35 8.13
a. Gross enrollment rates are used because net enrollment rates are not available for all countries.
Source:  World Bank 1997b.  Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey (1995) for the last column.
Education alone is not a guarantee for sustainable economic growth.  Sri Lanka had higher
per capita income than the republic of Korea in the 1960s, and its social indicators outstripped
those in many low-income countries.  But its income growth stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s.
For some time East Asia has scored high both in the importance people attach to basic education
(the demand side) and its broad availability (the supply side).  But the recent financial crises have
exposed the need for East Asian countries to restructure their economies and upgrade their supply
of high-skilled labor and their regulatory capability.
Evidence on Access to Education: The Case of Korea
Through a massive national literacy campaign, the Republic of Korea increased its literacy
rate from 55 percent in 1945 to 68 percent in 1960 and 88 percent in 1970.  Korea achieved
universal enrollment in primary schools by 1965, in middle school by the mid-1980s, and in high
school by the late 1980s.  Enrollment in higher education has also expanded rapidly, reaching 40
percent in 1990.
Korea’s experience is marked by a rapid expansion of primary education and equal access
to education.  Korea closed the gap between genders at the primary school level in the mid-1960s
and at the secondary school level in the late 1980s.  Korea vastly reduced education inequality
between 1970 and 1995.  Its Gini coefficient of education started at a higher level than that of
Brazil in 1970, 0.439, but declined dramatically to 0.189 in 1995, the lowest among the 12
countries in this study (table 2. For methodology see appendix I).  Korea’s economy also grew
rapidly during this time, soaring ahead at double-digit rates between 1965 and 1979.  As
government revenue and household income grew, more public and private funding was devoted to
education.  As the economy opened to international market, demand for skilled workers increased
7which provided incentives for getting education. As a result, a virtuous circle was created where
education and growth reinforced each other and both contributed to welfare.
Table 2. GINI Index of Education
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995*
Brazil 0.413 0.367 0.373 0.369 0.314 0.260
Chile 0.279 0.275 0.267 0.263 0.266 0.270
China 0.450 0.452 0.447 0.442 0.411 0.379
Colombia 0.415 0.386 0.397 0.399 0.409 0.420
India 0.370 0.394 0.363 0.393 0.422 0.452
Korea 0.439 0.382 0.351 0.296 0.242 0.189
Mexico 0.420 0.415 0.428 0.410 0.365 0.320
Malaysia 0.445 0.439 0.426 0.413 0.398 0.383
Peru 0.428 0.424 0.392 0.391 0.379 0.367
Philippines 0.368 0.320 0.314 0.313 0.309 0.305
Thailand 0.378 0.369 0.268 0.327 0.348 0.370
Venezuela 0.425 0.426 0.351 0.350 0.347 0.345
* 1995 data is based on projections. See Appendix I for methodology.
Policy Reform and Education: The Case of China
The Chinese government started to invest heavily in education and public health since the
1950s. Its social indicators outstripped those of other low-income countries. Primary enrollment in
1980 reached 103 for girls and 121 for boys, and secondary enrollment was 37 and 54. But factors
such as a lack of openness, restricted labor mobility, distorted wages and prices, prevented
educated workers from finding the most productive use of their talents.
Economic growth did not take off until the policy reforms started in 1978. China started
with easy reforms (such as rural and trade reforms) and only later moved on to more complex and
politically more difficult reforms (such as state enterprise and banking reforms). Learning  has
been incorporated in the process of reforms, as reflected by Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying,
“crossing the river by feeling the stones at the bottom.”
China opened its doors early on to foreign trade and investment by experimentation.  It
established four special economic zones in 1980; by 1993 it had more than 9,000 economic zones,
which played an important role in attracting foreign direct investment, stimulating trade, bringing
in advanced technology, and upgrading industries.  Similarly China’s price reform was gradual.
The scope of planning has been systematically reduced.  A dual price approach was adopted in
1984 that combined some price setting by the government  for products and materials allocated by
the plans, and price setting by markets otherwise. This approach allowed decisionmaking to be
determined at the margin by market prices. By 1994, 90 percent of price had been liberalized.
Reform of  state-owned enterprises has been a process of learning by doing as well.  The
first phase (1979-86) focused on giving a certain amount of autonomy to enterprises in exchange
for greater efficiency, and the second phase (1987-91) focused on improving managerial
mechanism. Since 1992 attention has shifted to clarifying property rights. By early 1998, 800
companies were listed on China’s two stock exchanges and thousands of firms are going through
ownership diversification, corporatization, divestiture, and other restructuring.  Its approach to
8reform has been especially conducive to learning-by-doing, human capital accumulation and
capacity building.
China has experienced the most rapid growth of any large country in the world during its
period of economic reform.  In less than two decades it has achieved what it took other countries
centuries to accomplish.   Its per capita income doubled between 1978 and 1987 and then doubled
again between 1987 and 1996 (table 3).  Over 170 million of the 270 million Chinese living in
absolute poverty in 1978 were raised above the poverty threshold.  China went from lackluster
growth of 3.9 percent before the reforms to 8 to 9.6 percent after the reforms.
This remarkable record could not have been achieved with policy reform alone, nor with
education alone.  Rather, much of it is the result of the interactions between policy reform and
learning and education. Many studies have found that a significant share of China’s growth can be
explained by the accumulation of human capital and the reallocation of resources (including human
resources) from low- to high-productivity sectors (table 1.1 in World Bank 1997).  Millions of
rural laborers found jobs in township and village enterprises, and millions of skilled workers found
higher-paying jobs in the private sector or foreign-funded enterprises.
Table 3. Average growth rates of GDP per capita, using Purchasing Power Parity
dollars (percent)
Average growth by decades Reform
period
Non-
reform
1970-79 1980-89 1990-95
Brazil 5.92 0.91 -0.09 -0.09 3.28
Chile 0.88 2.58 5.08 3.12 -0.32
China 3.92 8.03 9.65 8.85 4.07
Colombia 3.16 1.53 2.52 2.60 2.21
India 0.39 3.71 2.77 3.32 2.15
Korea, Rep. of 8.69 6.52 6.89 6.99 8.42
Mexico 3.45 -0.18 -0.65 0.98 1.02
Malaysia 5.40 3.01 6.33 4.40 5.35
Peru 0.87 -2.05 2.07 2.07 -0.67
Philippines 3.26 -0.42 0.13 0.72 1.10
Thailand 4.11 5.24 8.01 7.55 3.89
Venezuela 0.03 -2.80 1.33 NA -0.79
Source: Authors’ calculations. See Appendix I for data and method.
Interaction of Openness and Education: Country and Project Evidence
Some countries have successfully combined openness and investment in learning and
education, forming a virtuous circle:  openness creates demand for education, and learning and
education make a country’s export sector more competitive.  Knowledge accumulation influences a
country’s trade performance and competitiveness (Grossman and Helpman 1989, 1990; Romer
1990); trade, in turn, enhances knowledge accumulation, especially through imports (Ben David
and Loewy 1995; Coe and Helpman 1993; Keller 1995; and Padoan 1996).  Lucas (1993) notes
that to sustain any kind of knowledge accumulation, a country has to be outward-oriented and a
significant exporter.  Young (1991) and Keller (1994) find that trade itself cannot be the engine of
growth, but rather must operate through some mechanism, such as the formation of human capital,
9to affect growth.  A World Bank ( 1991) study found that economic growth rates in a sample of 60
developing countries during 1965-87 (Updated to 1994 later) were especially high where there was a
combination of a high level of education and macroeconomic stability and openness.  The impact of
trade openness on long-term growth thus depends on how well people are able to absorb and use
the information and technology made available through trade and foreign investment.
Thomas and Wang (1997) looked at the interaction of openness and education and the
impact on the performance of the World Bank’s lending projects.3  On an average, countries with a
more educated labor force and a more open economy had a rate of return on projects 3 percentage
points higher than those that had only one or the other (figure 1).
Figure 1.  Education and openness interact and increase investment returns
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of 1,265 World Bank Projects
Note: Economic rates of return are from the evaluation database of the Operations Evaluation Department.  Education
is measured by the average level of schooling of the labor force, and openness by the logarithm of the foreign
exchange parallel market premium.  Source: Author’s calculations.
We have examined case studies of the importance to economic growth of the distribution
of education and of the interaction of policy reform and education.  We turn next to theoretical
models and empirical investigations of the distribution of education and the interaction of policy
reforms and education.
                                                       
3  The cross-country project-level data set includes variables on education, per capita income, openness,
government expenditure, and project performance. The project data cover 3,590 lending projects in
109 countries evaluated by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) in 1974-94, with the OED
rating of overall performance (satisfactory/not) and economic rates of return.
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III.  The Distribution of Education Matters
Aggregation, Asset Distribution, and Economic Growth
Most assets are tradable across firms or individuals.  This tradability in a context
of competitive markets provides a powerful justification for aggregating assets into an aggregate
production function.  If physical capital, for example, is freely traded across firms in a perfectly
competitive environment, then the contribution of physical capital to aggregate output will not be
affected by its distribution across firms or individuals.  The reason is straightforward: since the
marginal product of physical capital is equal for all firms, reducing the capital of one firm and
increasing it for another by the same amount will not affect the aggregate output of the economy.
If an asset is not traded or is imperfectly traded, however, then the marginal product of the asset
across individuals is not generally equalized.  In this case aggregate production depends not only
on the total level of the asset but also on its distribution.  These insights have been well known at
least since Gorman’s work in 1950.  It is surprising, however, that they have not been exploited
systematically in growth models.
The assumption of tradability is probably reasonable for most assets, including physical
capital, land, and other resources (although tradability may not always be sufficient to equalize
asset returns across firms or households).  Where this assumption is probably least reasonable is
for the distribution of education across individuals. Education and skills cannot be directly traded:
only certain services of these skills are traded.  This impose restrictions that may ultimately imply
systematic heterogeneity of the marginal product of education across individuals.
The vast variability of natural abilities across individuals and the fact that the education
children received depends on factors other than their abilities (parents’ income, regional location,
availability of schools) and is largely determined by nonmarket mechanisms (including government
allocation of education services) imply that education levels are not necessarily highly correlated
with abilities.  That is, the limited role of the market in allocating education may imply large
divergence in the value of the marginal products of education across individuals, beyond
differences that could be explained by differences in ability.
The importance of these imperfections in the allocation of education and the consequences
of such misallocations for aggregate income are examined in this section.  We first set up a
theoretical framework that integrates asset distribution in the derivation of an aggregate value
added or GDP function yielding a structural empirical model.  Next we estimate such a model for a
group of middle-income developing countries using panel data for 1970-94.
Consider the following production function of individual i,
                                        ab= iiii haAky
(1.1)
where yi is value added of individual i, A is the coefficient of total factor productivity associated
with the overall conditions of the economy, ki is the share of total capital that corresponds to the
individual, ai is a parameter reflecting the level of ability of individual i and hi is the level of
education of individual i.  The variable k represents the tradable factors that have equal marginal
products across individual.  Thus we assume that k can be aggregated without consideration of its
distribution across individuals.
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where y0 is per capita GDP, N is the total number of individuals in the economy, k0 is the average
or per capita stock of tradable assets, the term in brackets is the aggregate per capita level of
education and aM and hM are the maximum levels of ability and education of the population.
Clearly, per capita income equation y0 in 1.2 is not in general independent of the distribution of h
and a across the population.
Define òòº a
MM h
0
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0
dhdaahH  and approximate it up to the second order using Taylor’s
theorem.  It is natural to use the mean education, h0, and mean ability, a0, as the point of
expansion.  Thus,
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Integrating and normalizing aM and hM to one, we obtain the expected or average value of H,
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where 2hs  is the variance of education, ahs  is the covariance of education and ability and 0h h/s
and 0ah h/s  are the coefficient of variability of education and the coefficient of covariability of
education and ability, respectively.  Using (1.4) in (1.2) we obtain,
)]h/()h/)(1(1[haAky 0ah
2
0h2
1
0000 sa+s-aa+= ab . (1.5)
Using the definition of the correlation coefficient, r, we have haah srs=s .  Taking logs of
equation 1.5 and replacing we have,
]h/)()h/)(1(1ln[hlnklnClnyln 0ha
2
0h2
1
000 srsa+s-aa++a+b+= . (1.6)
It can be shown that if education is optimally allocated, (if the marginal product of
education is equalized across individuals), then 1=r  and a0h 1
h s
a-
=s .  That is, there is a
perfect correlation between education and ability, and the standard deviation of education mirrors
the standard deviation of ability.
To see this consider a two-stage maximization. In the first stage individuals optimize with
respect to capital given their abilities ai and education hi:
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where Ri is the net revenue of individual i conditional on ai and hi and pk is the rental price of
capital.  By using the first-order conditions of equation 1.7 and replacing the optimal value of ki on
the objective function, we obtain the following (indirect) revenue function for individual i,
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In the second stage individuals maximize Ri with respect to hi.  If education is perfectly
allocated, then the allocation of h is such that all individuals equalize their marginal value products
of education to a common rental price of education, ph.  Thus, in the second stage individuals,
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The first order condition of equation 1.10 is,
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Normalizing ph = 1, and defining bpA
~
1k º-b
b
 we have
                          b-a-b-= 1i1i hba (1.11)
From equation 1.6 it is clear that the effect of sh/h0 on y0 is negative as long as
a
0
h 1
h rs
a-
>s .  If education is efficiently allocated across individuals then a0h 1
h s
a-
=s  and
r = 1, in which case the marginal effect of sh/h0 on income vanishes.  If the coefficient of
variability of education is greater than rsa/(1 - a) then per capita income can be increased by
reducing the dispersion of education.  If the coefficient is less than rsa/(1 – a) then per capita
income can be increased by concentrating education more among the people that have greater
abilities.
Results:  The Extended Production Function with Distribution of Education
An implication of the previous section is that one possible reason for why the role of
education in production may not be captured in empirical studies that control for country (fixed)
effects are specification biases arising from aggregation problems.  Explicit consideration of
aggregation leads us to two key issues, (i) the role of the distribution of education, an important
variable omitted by previous studies, and (ii) the proper specification of an explicitly aggregated
production function which turns out to be non-linear.
Table 4 reports four estimates of the aggregate per capita production function for the
twelve middle income countries of our sample for the period 1970-94.  The first row of Table 4
presents the traditional fixed effect log-linear model that ignores both of the above issues.  As can
be seen, human capital has a positive but non-significant effect.
The second column of Table 4 shows the fixed effect model still in log-linear from but now
allowing the distribution of education to play a role.  In fact, after some preliminary trials it was
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found that while the effects of average education, physical capital and of the 1982-85 dummy for
the world crisis were not statistical different across countries, the effect of the education variability
coefficient was statistically different across countries.  This cross countries diversity of the effect
of education dispersion is consistent with the idea presented above that the effect of education
dispersion is likely to vary and change sign according to whether it is below or above its optimal
level.  In this specification the effect of average education becomes negative and significant at 10%
level of significance.  Thus, the partial correction of the aggregation problem seems to make things
“worse” in terms of the coefficient of average education.
The third column of Table 4 presents the results obtained by using the non-linear
specification suggested by the theoretical model.  That is, this specification deals with both the
omitted variable and the functional form specification problems.  In this case we obtain that the
coefficient of average education becomes positive and statistically significant at 10%.  The
coefficients of the variability of education for the various countries are jointly significant at 1%,
although 8 of the 12 coefficients are not statistically different from zero.
The last column of Table 4 uses the standard deviation in logs as another measure of
dispersion of education instead of the coefficient of variability.  Two things emerge from this last
regression: First, the effect of average education continues to be positive, but now becomes much
more significant.  Second, this measure of dispersion exerts a much greater effect on per capita
income, with most coefficients being now highly significant.  Most of these coefficients are now
negative and highly significant.  Moreover, there is now a negative correlation (about –0.26)
between the average value of the log standard deviation for the period and the impact of education
dispersion on per capita income of each country.  That is, these estimates suggest that the greater is
the dispersion of education, the more negative is its effect on per capita income.  This result is
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model under the assumption that the level and
distribution of abilities are the same in all countries.
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Table 4.  Production Function Estimation
Fixed Effects1
excluding effect of
education
distribution
Fixed Effects1
log-linear allowing
for education
distribution effect
using coeff. of
variability of
education
Non Linear
Fixed Effects2
allowing for education
distribution effects
using coeff. of
variability of
education
Fixed Effects1
allowing for education
distribution effects
using standard
deviation of the log of
education
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Human capital 0.496
(0.369)
-0.182*
(0.103)
0.088*
(0.046)
0.098**
(0.011)
Capital 0.299**
(0.025)
0.330**
(0.009)
0.327**
(0.004)
0.257**
(0.008)
Dummy 1982-85 -0.029**
(0.011)
-0.018*
(0.011)
-0.034*
(0.019)
-0.023**
(0.010)
Education distribution
       effects
  Brazil 1.130**
(0.569)
-0.404
(0.930)
-0.495**
(0.083)
  Chile -2.476**
(0.390)
0.586
(0.775)
-0.986**
(0.082)
  China -5.163**
(1.999)
-7.851*
(4.416)
0.923**
(0.204)
  Colombia 1.044
(0.687)
0.516
(0.426)
-0.891**
(0.091)
  India -1.224**
(0.244)
1.480**
(0.147)
0.174
(0.132)
  Korea -1.030**
(0.074)
-0.572
(0.747)
-0.297**
(0.044)
  Mexico 0.402**
(0.188)
-0.572
(0.747)
-0.923**
(0.091)
  Malaysia 0.160
(0.657)
0.543
(0.846)
-1.010**
(0.092)
  Peru 1.040**
(0.329)
0.745*
(0.387)
-1.556**
(0.213)
  Philippines 0.451
(1.064)
-0.475
(1.237)
-0.461**
(0.095)
  Thailand -0.540
(1.108)
-0.357
(0.905)
-0.245**
(0.062)
  Venezuela 1.336**
(0.496)
1.621*
(0.905)
-1.578**
(0.097)
Note:  One star denotes significance at the 10% level, while two stars denote significance at the 5% level.
1. A first-order autoregressive coefficient was estimated by Maximum Likelihood for each country separately.  This
information was used to correct the data.  Standard errors reported correspond to White’s heteroscedastic
consistent covariance estimator.
2. A first-order autoregressive coefficient was estimated by Maximum Likelihood for each country separately.
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IV.  The Policy Environment for Education is Crucial
Growth and Human Capital
The theoretical model underlying the empirical growth equations is based on the two-factor growth
model discussed by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995).  The model assumes that the economy can
accumulate two factors of production, physical capital and human capital, yielding the possibility
of long-run unbounded growth or stagnation.
Consider an aggregate production function,
Y F K hL v= ( , ; ) (2.1)
where K is total physical capital, h is human capital per capita, and L is the labor force and v is a
vector of other variables that affect total factor productivity.  The vector v includes the policy
environment and the distribution of nontraded assets.  Dividing the left and right sides of equation
2.1 by L yelds
Y
L
y L F k h v= = W ( , ; ) , (2.1’)
where y is output per capita and k is capital stock per capita.  We assume that F(.) is a
homogenous function but not necessarily of degree one.  If F(.) is homogeneous of degree one then
W=0, meaning that y is not dependent on the size of the labor force.  Otherwise, W<0 if F(.) is
homogeneous of degree less than one, and W>0 if it is homogenous of  degree greater than one.
The economy accumulates k and h by investing in either of them,
kIk kk d-=& (2.2)
                          hIh hh d-=&
where Ik is gross investment per capita in physical capital and Ih in human capital, and dk and dh
are the rates of depreciation of k and h.
The economy’s budget constraint at each point in time (the time subscripts are suppressed)
is
c L F k h v I Ik h= - -W ( , ; ) (2.3)
where c is per capita consumption or real per capita income of the economy at each point in time.
We assume a constant risk aversion cardinal utility function, q+
q+
= 1c
1
1u , as usual in growth
models, where u is utility of the representative consumer and q is the coefficient of risk aversion.
Maximization of the present discounted value of u subject to equation 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 over an
infinite horizon yields the usual Hamiltonian function,
            H = q+
q+
1c
1
1
 + lLW[F(k, h; v) – Ik – Ih – c] + g(Ik - dkk) + h(Ih – dhh), (2.4)
where l is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint and g and h are the costate variables
associated with k and h, respectively.
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Barro and Sala-I-Martin assume that F(×) is linearly homogeneous in k and h (and hence
that W=0).  This implies that in the long-run, once the net marginal products of both types of
capital are equalized, the economy may reach a unique k/h ratio. We do not impose this assumption
here, meaning that positive long-run growth is not assured.
The first-order conditions of this problem (assuming a constant L) include,
(i)                    cq = l, (2.5)
(ii)                   (g - l)Ik = 0       ;       Ik ³ 0,
(iii)                  (h - l)Ih = 0      ;       Ih ³ 0,
(iv)                   g&  = (r + dk)g - l LWF1(×)
(v)                     h&  = (r + dh)h - l LWF2(×)
where r is the discount rate and F1 º ¶f/¶k and F2 º ¶F/¶h.  Additionally, of course, the necessary
conditions include equations of motion 2.2 (i) and 2.2 (ii) as well as transversality conditions.  Note
that we added non-negativity constraints on investment.
As Barro and Sala-I-Martin note, the long-run equilibrium can be obtained by assuming
that both Ik and Ih are strictly positive.  In this case we have that l = g = h and h=g && .  Hence, in
long-run equilibrium we would have,
 LWF1(k, h; v) - dk = LWF2(k, h; v) - dh (2.6)
that is, the net marginal products of both factors are equalized in the long run.  If F(×) exhibits
constant returns to scale (CRS) in k and h, then F1(×) and F2(×) are homogenous of degree zero in k
and h (and LW=1).  This implies that they can be written exclusively as functions of the factor
ratios.  That is, under CRS equation 2.6 solves for
                        (k/h)* = f(v, dk - dh) (2.7)
where f(×) is a well-defined function.  That is, if F(×) exhibits CRS and is concave, there is a
unique (optimal) factor ratio that the economy would approach in the long run.  If F(×) does not
exhibit CRS then there is not a unique k/h optimal ratio. However, a correspondence between k and
h may still exist in the long run,,
                       k* = y (v, dk - dh, hL). (2.8)
Given concavity and gross complementarity between k and h, we have that ¶k*/¶h > 0 (also ¶h*/¶k
> 0).
In the short run if for a given h, k < k* (where k* is defined by equation 2.8), then k is the
binding factor and growth of the economy in the short-run depends on the accumulation of k.
Alternatively, if for a given h, k > k* then the economy’s growth is based on the accumulation of h
(Ih > 0, Ik = 0 in this case).  Similarly, in the CRS case if in the short-run k/h < (k/h)*, k then is the
binding resource and the economy’s rate of growth is given by the accumulation of k until it
reaches the long-run ratio.  If k/h > (k/h)* the opposite happens.
In the short and intermediate runs, therefore, we have:
(a)                g > 0, Ik > 0, h = Ih = 0 if k is the binding resource.
(b)                h > 0, Ih > 0, g = Ik = 0 if h is the binding resource.
Differentiating equation 2.5 (a) under alternatives a or b, we obtain the following
alternative specifications for the economy’s growth rate g over the short and intermediate runs:
     ga = 
q
1
 [LWF1(k, h; v) – (r + dk)] (2.9)
if k is the binding factor of production, or
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                 gb = 
q
1
 [LWF2(k, h; v) – (r + dh)] (2.10)
if h is the binding resource.  ga or gb is the rate of growth of c or income.
Specifications 2.9 or 2.10 imply that if specification 2.9 prevails then the growth rate ga
would be decreasing in k and increasing in h (this is so because F11 < 0 by concavity and F12 > 0 by
gross complementarity).  That is, if the binding resource is k (there is too little physical capital
relative to human capital) then the rate of growth will be declining in the (predetermined) stock of k
and increasing in h.  The opposite happens if the binding resource is h.  In this case the rate of
growth over the short and intermediate runs is given by gb in specification 2.10, and it is increasing
in k and decreasing in h.  This provides a basis for empirically testing whether an economy’s
binding resource constraint is related to human or physical capital.
We note that in long-run equilibrium (where equation 2.6 holds) ga = gb ¾  that is, the two
growth regimes coincide.  Also, if CRS prevail then growth in either regime depends only on the
k/h ratio.  It is increasing on k/h under regime b and it decreasing in k/h under regime a.  The long-
run growth rate may be positive even under CRS.  This is so if F1((k/h)*, 1; r) + dk º r* º F2((k/h)*,
1; v) - dh > r.  If, however, r* < r, that is, if the net marginal products of the resources are, when
evaluated at the long-run ratio (k/h)*, less than the discount rate r, then growth will be smothered
before k/h reaches (k/h)*  (López, 1998).  That is ga or gb becomes zero before reaching the optimal
ratio (k/h)*.
The model assumes that the accumulation of both physical and human capital is driven by
private profitability motives.  In reality, part of the accumulation of human capital is dictated by
the government.  Since investments in education are, in important ways, a policy variable.  Private
investments in human capital generally take up the slack left by public education.   Also,
investments in education are not likely to be driven exclusively by economic efficiency
considerations.  Thus in many instances the stock of human capital can be considered largely
nonoptimal (and to some extent exogenous).  However, private education is likely to be significant
at the margin, by affecting the net changes of education.  And the private sector largely controls
investment in physical capital, which responds in part to the stock of human capital.  The large role
of the public sector in education implies that the economy is less likely to be at a balanced growth
stage.  The relationship between h and k is may not be optimal at each point in time and thus the
economy is almost continuously in the process of adjusting the stock of k in relation to h.
Empirical Specification of the Growth Model
In order to derive an empirical specification for growth rates ga or gb, we use discrete
approximations for equations 2.9 and 2.10:
     )]r()v;h,k(F[1g k1t1t1t1
a
t d+-q
= --- (2.9¢)
or
                 )]r()v;h,k(F[1g h1t1t1t2
b
t d+-q
= --- . (2.10¢)
These specifications are highly consistent with the temporary equilibrium interpretation of the
growth model.  At the beginning of each period (or the end of the previous period), decisionmakers
evaluate the marginal returns to each factor of production, comparing them with their respective
18
marginal costs (r + dk or r + dh).  If the marginal return of a factor is above its marginal cost, there
is positive investment in that factor during the period; otherwise not. Relating the growth rate in
period t to stocks of factors at time t – 1 and structural factors (vector v) at   t – 1 considerably
reduces the simultaneity biases that usually plague growth estimates.  Biases due to omitted
variables can still be a problem, although with panel data much of the problems related to time-
invariant country-specific omitted variables can be reduced by using within estimators.  The only
remaining problem is omitted variables that are country specific but change through time.
In addition to the marginal effect of the factors of production the policy environment
variables (vector v) are also allowed to affect total factor productivity.  We are particularly
interested in distinguishing countries and periods in which structural adjustment has occurred from
those with a traditional inward regime and heavy government intervention, exchange controls, and
highly restrictive trade policies.  Thus we use the following empirical specification:
          1t,ih1t,ik1t,i0
i
0it hlnklnDVg --- a+a+b+a= + aLlnLi,t-1 (2.11)
                    it1t,i1t,ih1t,i1t,ik hlnDVbklnDVb e+++ ---- ,
where  git    is growth rate of country i in period t,  Dvit   is a dummy variable equal to zero in
periods under the traditional policy regime and equal to one in periods when structural reforms are
in place   ki, t - 1   is the stock of physical capital in country i at time t – 1,  hi, t - 1  is the stock of
human capital in country i at time t – 1,  Li,t-1  is thelabor force at time t-1, i0a   is the fixed country
effect that includes total factor productivity levels and is also related to the marginal costs, ri +
dk/qi or ri + dh/qi ,  and eit  is the random disturbance satisfying the usual properties.
Equation 2.11 is the benchmark empirical specification.  Several variants are also
estimated.  We allow for the policy regime to be quite general, affecting the marginal (logarithmic)
effects of each factor of production as well as the intercept.  One hypothesis is that distortionary
regimes tend to reduce the impact of human capital and to increase the impact of physical capital
on growth:  most distortions in developing countries protect capital-intensive activities and tax
human capital intensive activities (Krueger, 1978; Bhagwati, 1978).  That is, we expect that bk < 0
and bh > 0.  (Though the model here obviously cannot account for interindustry effects such as
these, López (1998) uses a two sector growth model and shows that the growth effects of capital
stocks are larger under conditions of protection to capital-intensive activities.)
Also, if growth is dictated by physical capital accumulation, then  ak < 0 and ak + bk < 0
while ah > 0 and ah + bh > 0.  If growth is dictated by human capital, then  ak > 0 and ak + bk > 0
and ah < 0 and ah + bh > 0.  Economic growth is more likely to be dictated by physical capital
accumulation in middle-income countries that have invested heavily in public education for long
periods of time and by human capital driven in generally poor countries that have underinvested in
education.
The coefficients in equation 2.11 can be related to the parameters of the underlying
production function.  Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function,
          F = AVh ka hd (2.12)
then from equations 2.9 or 2.10,
                              k
a
F
1a
kln
g
q
-=
¶
¶
 ;               k
a
F
d
hln
g
q
=
¶
¶
or, alternatively,
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                               h
b
F
a
kln
g
q
=
¶
¶
      ;              h
b
F
1d
hln
g
q
-=
¶
¶
.
Hence,
                                
d
1a
hln/g
kln/g
a
a -=
¶¶
¶¶
    ;        
1d
a
hln/g
kln/g
b
b
-
=
¶¶
¶¶
. (2.13)
Combining equations 2.11 and 2.13 we can identify the ratio of the parameters associated with k
and h in the underlying production function.  Note that this provides a test for CRS:  Under CRS in
k and h,  1 – a = d.  Hence, the ratios in equation 2.13 are in this case equal to -1.
Results for the Growth and Human Capital Model
We estimated the fixed-effect model (equation 2.11 and several variants.) Related
specifications include the suppression of the labor force as an explanatory variable and the
inclusion of the coefficient of variability of education as an additional explanatory variable.  The
use of the labor force as an explanatory variable could decrease problems of heteroscadasticity,
while the use of the coefficient of variability of education is consistent with the asset distribution
model presented in section III.4  We also estimate the growth equation using a random-effect
specification as an alternative to the fixed-effect model.
Table 5 presents two estimations for the fixed-effect and two for the random-effect models.
The fixed-effect model that includes the labor force as an explanatory model seems better because
it passes the White specification test; that without the labor force does not. Also, both estimators
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient value of average schooling of the labor force is equal to
minus the coefficient value of the stock of capital per capita (that is, they reject a specification that
uses k/h as the explanatory variable instead of k and h as separate variables).  That is, we reject the
CRS hypothesis, meaning that the labor force should be an explanatory variable.
The estimated parameters in the fixed-effect and random-effect specifications are quite
similar and highly robust with respect to changes of specification.  Increases in the stock of human
capital tend to accelerate growth, particularly under free market conditions and an outwardly
oriented economic structure.  In the random-effect specifications, education has no significant
effect on economic growth in the absence of these conditions and in the fixed-effect specifications,
this effect is significant at the 10%.  The effect of average education on growth is zero or barely
significant in closed or semiclosed and highly regulated economies, but very large and significant
once economies become outwardly oriented with reduced government intervention. A 5% increase
in the average schooling of the labor force, all else remaining the same, accelerates the annual
growth rate by about 0.85 percentage points in a free market environment.
By contrast, the negative impact of capital on growth is much larger in periods of liberal
policies than in periods of regulated economic environments.  This is consistent with the fact that
most countries in the sample protected their capital-intensive activities during periods of heavy
government intervention.  Thus, once the policy environment is liberalized, capital-intensive
                                                       
4  The asset distribution model, however, predicts that the coefficient of variability of education affects the
production function (and, hence, the growth rate) in a highly nonlinear form.  In the growth model
we only consider log linear specifications due to the difficulties of estimating a nonlinear growth
model.
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activities get lose protection, with a consequent reduction in the contribution of physical capital to
growth.
An increase in the stock of physical capital, maintaining human capital constant, exerts a
negative effect on the rate of growth for both distorted economic regimes and free market regimes.
Using the fixed-effect estimates in column 1 of table 5, a 5 percent increase in capital stocks
reduces the annual rate of growth by about 0.2 percentage points in periods of liberal policy
environments.  This negative effect of capital on the growth rate is consistent with a positive effect
on output levels.
The negative effect of an increase in physical capital stocks on growth and the positive
effect of human capital indicate that growth rates are determined by a regime in which capital per
capita rather than average schooling of the labor force is the binding constraint (see equation 2.9¢).
That is, these results suggest that these economies have levels of capital per capita that are below
the long-run equilibrium, k* (see equation 2.8),  or, equivalently, that the stock of human capital is
too large for the stock of physical capital.  The growth rate is dictated by the gap between the net
marginal value of physical capital and its marginal cost (rather than by the human capital gap that
is not necessarily positive).  In other words, these economies have not yet reached a balanced
growth stage, and economic growth is declining as k/h increases toward its long-run equilibrium.
Balanced expansion of both human and physical capital increases the rate of economic
growth under liberal economic regimes but not necessarily under restrictive regimes.  An increase
of both human and physical capital stocks by 5% under a liberal economic environment may
increase the growth rate by  0.65 percentage points.
Overall the results indicate that economic policies that suppress market forces tend to
dramatically reduce the impact of human capital on economic growth.  Moreover, the results
suggest that the economies in the sample are in a phase of diminishing growth as the stock of
physical capital increases relative to human capital.
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Table 5.  The growth equation under various specifications
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Average schooling 0.111*
(0.063)
0.094*
(0.058)
-0.006
(0.027)
-0.017
(0.026)
Schooling  ´reform dummy
variable
0.186**
(0.047)
0.183**
(0.047)
0.182**
(0.046)
0.174**
(0.046)
Per capita capital stock -0.027*
(0.016)
-0.033**
(0.015)
-0.017*
(0.009)
-0.013*
(0.007)
Capital  ´reform dummy variable -0.036**
(0.011)
-0.036**
(0.010)
-0.036**
(0.010)
-0.035**
(0.010)
Dummy 82-85 -0.021**
(0.007)
-0.021**
(0.006)
-0.022**
(0.006)
-0.023**
(0.006)
Labor force -0.090*
(0.049)
-0.083*
(0.048)
-0.005
(-0.006)
--
Coefficient of variability of
schooling
0.034
(0.047)
-- 0.013
(0.035)
--
Homoscedasticity
(Breusch-Pagan test)
Rejected at 5% Rejected at 5% Not rejected
at 5%
Not rejected at
5%
White Test of Specification Rejected at 5% Rejected at 5%
Hausman test: Fixed vs random
effects
-- -- Not rejected
at 5%
Not rejected at
5%
Notes:
* means significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%.
All variables are in log form. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period
Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.
.
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      V.  Conclusions
In reconfirming the importance of education, this paper has emphasized the importance of quality
as well as quantity. The qualitative side includes the conventional issues of the relevance of the
curriculum, the nature of adult learning, and the impact of  learning,  aspects that are important in
determining whether the education makes a difference to economic performance.  In addition, we
emphasize two other aspects of quality not often assessed in the literature: distribution of education
and the link between policies and the input of education.
The distribution of education matters and  equal access seems key.  Unequal distribution of
education tends to have a negative impact on per capita income in most countries.  Moreover,
controlling for human capital distribution and the use of appropriate functional form specifications
consistent with the asset allocation model makes a difference for the effect of mean education on
per capita income.  Controlling for education distribution leads to positive and significant effects of
average education on per capita income, while failure to do so leads to insignificant and even
negative effects of average education.
There is a clear link between economic policies and the impact of education.  The focus on
education matters little for growth unless people can use education in competitive and open
markets.  The larger and more competitive these markets, the greater are the prospects for using
education and skills.
These insights about the importance of equity and policy provide a basis for linking
education policy and economic policy reform.  Economic policymakers should recognize that
investments in education, including improvements in equality, are essential for economic success.
Education policymakers would do well to recognize that the economic policy environment crucially
influences the impact of education.  The policy environment can also help to induce quality
improvements in education and to calibrate the distribution of education to patterns that make for
the greatest welfare improvements.  The evidence on this two-way link is the most important
finding of this study.
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Appendix I:  Data, Sources and Methodology
Data
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the distribution of education, economic
reform and economic growth by a panel data set of 12 countries from 1970 to 1994.  The data set consists
of variables on GDP per capita measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) and by constant dollars,
physical capital stock, labor, level of education of the labor force, and the distribution of education in the
labor force,  terms of trade, a dummy variable on economic reforms, and a few time dummies.5 Most data
was extracted  from the World Bank’s main database, except for a few.
Output level is measured by GDP per capita in constant US dollar at 1987 prices. Growth rates
are calculated using the log-difference method.  In order to allow cross country comparison of
“unexplained residual” or total factor productivity, we also converted GDP into one measured by
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or international dollars, by using a single year (1995) PPP conversion
ratios.  Table 3 shows the average growth rates by decades and for reform versus non-reform periods.  See
also the charts at the end of the paper.
For physical capital stock, we used the variable estimated by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) using
the perpetual inventory method.   Gross domestic investment as a ratio of GDP was used as a proxy
measure in some regressions. Labor input was taken from the labor force information from the World
Bank main database.  For human capital stock, we used the variable---average years of schooling for the
labor force, as estimated by Nehru, Swanson and Dubey 1994.
The distribution of education was characterized by coefficient of variability of education for
population aged over 15, and several other dispersion measures.  The calculation took several steps.  First,
we obtain data on educational attainment at various levels for the population over the age 15 from Barro
and Lee 1997.  Second, school cycling data was obtained from Psacharopoulos & Arriagada 1986, Table
B-1. Third, we then calculated the mean year of education, variance of education, standard deviation of
education, coefficient of variability of education, and GINI coefficient all for the population aged over 15.
Table 2 presents the calculated coefficient of variability of education by five-year intervals.  In most
countries, this variable shows a decline over 25 year period.
The dummy variables for economic reforms (DREF) and for political upheavals (DPOL) were
constructed based on the chronological description of development and reform for each country (Appendix
II), which summarize both the economic and the political processes occurred in the 12 countries during
the historical period from 1970 to 1995.  On the terms of trade (TOT), we used the country specific terms
of trade for each country whenever it is available in the IMF International Finance Statistics Yearbook
(IFS).  Some proxy measures were used when the TOT data is not available for a particular country.
Twelve countries were selected into the sample based on the following rationales: First,
determined by the objectives of this paper, we must select countries which conducted some policy reforms.
Second, the effects of policy reforms must have been felt within a reasonable period.  This rules out most
countries in East Europe and Formal Soviet Union because their market reforms were too recent.  This
also rules out some low-income countries in Africa where the implementation of reform measures were
too uncertain due to weak institutions or lack of legal infrastructure.  Third, in order to do a good in depth
analysis, one has to be reasonably familiar with the economy and political history in these countries.  Data
availability, our knowledge regarding the countries and resource constraint put a limit on the number of
                                                       
5  We are grateful to Jong-Wha Lee and Robert Barro, V. Nehru and S.Patel for kindly allowing us to use
the education, and capital variables that they have.  Other variables are from the World Bank main
database.
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countries that can be included in the study.  Our sample thus include Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia,
India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela, which are, largely,
middle income countries with a per capita income of over $1500 PPP dollars in three regions, Latin
America, East Asia and South Asia.
Table A1. Coefficient of Variability of Education for Population 15 Years and Older
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Brazil 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.79 0.71
Chile 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
China .. 1.02 0.92 0.89 0.76 0.62
Colombia 1.02 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93
India 1.74 1.64 1.62 1.50 1.37 1.24
Korea, Rep. of 0.93 0.70 0.60 0.52 0.42 0.31
Mexico 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.68 0.50
Malaysia 1.03 0.95 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70
Peru 0.93 0.93 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.77
Philippines 0.80 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.57
Thailand 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.73
Venezuela 1.09 1.04 0.70 0.71 0.78 0.85
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Sources of data
Variable Meaning Source  Notes
GDP GDP in constant 1987 US $ WDI (see note 1) 1970-1995
OGDP GDP in constant 1987 local currency WDI 1970-1995
CGDP GDP in current local currency WDI 1970-1995
INV Gross domestic investment in constant
1987 US $
WDI 1970-1995
L Population WDI 1970-1995
LBR Labor force WDI 1970-1995
EDU Human capital stock: total mean years
education
Nehru, Swanson & Dubey, 1994
(see note 2)
1970-1992
CAP Total physical capital stock in constant
1987 local currency (original)
Nehru & Dhareshwar ,1993 1970-1990
KAP Total physical capital stock in constant
1987 local currency (converted)
calculated based on Nehru &
Dhareshwar ,1993
1970-1990
KKAP Total physical capital stock in constant
1987 US $.
KKAP=KAP*GDP/OGDP
calculated 1970-1990
KPPP PPP conversion rate, KPPP =
(GNP per capita, Constant 1995 int’l $) /
(GNP/Population constant 1987 $)
calculated 1970-1995
PPP GDP in PPP terms.
PPP = GDP * KPPP
calculated 1970-1995
PPPC GDP per capita in PPP terms calculated 1970-1995
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PPPC = PPP / Population
UVI Unit value of import IFS (see note 3)
Copperchl Copper price for Chilean TOT IFS
TOT Terms of trade IFS and calculated (see note 4) 1970-1995
DREF Dummy variable for reforms constructed (see note 5) 1970-1995
DPOL Dummy variable for political upheaval constructed (see note 5) 1970-1995
EDI mean years of education for the population
age over 15
constructed  from
(a) Barro & Lee 1997 and
(b) Psacharopoulos & Arriagada
(see note 6, 7, 8)
1970-1995
EDV variance of education for the population age
over 15
constructed 1970-1995
EDS standard deviation of education for the
population age over 15
constructed 1970-1995
EDZ coefficient of variability of education for the
population age over 15
constructed 1970-1995
GINI GINI index of education for the population
age over 15
constructed 1970-1995
THL Theil index of education for the population
age over 15
constructed 1970-1995
SDL Standard Deviation of Logs of education for
the population age over 15
constructed 1970-1995
End Notes for the data sources and data calculations
1. WDI
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), CD-ROM.
2. Nehru & Dhareshwar, 1993
Nehru, Vikram, and Ashok Dhareshwar. 1993. "A New Database on Physical Capital
Stock: Sources, Methodology and Results." Revista de Análisis Economico 8 (1): 37-59.
Nehru, Vikram, Eric Swanson, and Ashok Dubey. 1994. “ A new database on human
capital stock: sources, methodology and results.”  Journal of Develoment Economics.
The two variables of (1) total physical capital (CAP) and (2) human capital stock: total
mean years education (EDU) are quoted from the above papers.
3. IFS
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IFS).
4. The terms of trade
For Brazil, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela, the
terms of trade are quoted directly for the IFS.   For Chile, China, Mexico, and Peru, the terms of
trade are not available from the IFS, and they are obtained through the following processes.
a.  For Chile, the terms of trade are substituted with the ratio of the copper price (Copperchl) to
the unit value of imports (UVICHL), let 1990 =100.
b.  For China, the terms of trade are substituted with the terms of trade of Asia.
c.  For Mexico, the terms of trade are substituted with the terms of trade of Venezuela.
d.   For Peru, the terms of trade are substituted with the terms of trade of Chile (see 4.2a)
5. The dummy variables for economic reforms and political upheavals
The dummy variables for economic market reforms (DREF) and for political upheavals (DPOL)
are constructed based on the country stories, which summarize both the economic and the
political processes occurred in the 12 countries during the historical period from 1970 to 1995.
 6. Barro & Lee
Barro, Robert and J.W. Lee, "International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality,”
AER, Papers and Proceedings, 86(2), pp. 218-223.  Data file “School4.raw” contains the data on
educational attainment at various levels for the population over the age 15.
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7. Psacharopoulos & Arriagada 1986
Psacharopoulos, George & Ana-Maria Arriagada. “The educational attainment of the labor force:
an international comparison.” The World Bank, October 1986. Report No.: EDT38.  Appendix
B, Table B-1: The Structure of Educational System.
8. EDI, EDV, EDS, and EDZ
First, we obtained education distribution data for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 from Barro
& Lee data file “School4.raw,” then make the categories of education distribution mutually
exclusive. Second, we obtained the school cycling data from Psacharopoulos & Arriagada data
Table B-1. Then we calculated the following:
EDI:  mean years of education for the population age over 15
EDV: variance of education for the population age over 15
EDS: standard deviation of education for the population age over 15
EDZ: coefficient of variability of education for the population age over 15
GINI: GINI index of education for the population age over 15.
The formula to calculate the GINI is:
åå --= > j jiji xxNN )1(
1
m
g . Where g is the GINI index, m is the mean of the variable,
and N is the total number of observations.
THL: Theil index of education for the population age over 15.
The formula to calculate the theil index is:
å ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ=
i
ii xx
N mm
t ln1 . Where t is the theil index, m is the mean of the variable, and N is the
total number of observations.
SDL: Standard Deviation of Logs of education for the population age over 15.
Finally, we estimated the values in between through linear interpolation.
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Appendix II  Chronology of Reforms and Development in 12 Countries
China:
Building Learning into Reforms
Development Strategy before 1978
China had a planned economic system from the 1950s to early 1970s, which was
endogenous to its development strategy and external environment.  Chinese leaders adopted a heavy
industry-oriented development strategy, similar to those of the former Soviet Union.  To implement
such a strategy in a poor rural and capital-scarce economy, it was imperative to artificially
underprice capital, foreign exchange, energy, raw materials, labor and other necessities in order to
lower the cost of capital formation in the heavy industry.   Plans and other administrative resource-
allocation mechanism were established in order to channel the scarce resources into heavy industry.
To exploit and control the surplus produced by micro-institutions (firms and farmers), industries
were nationalized and peasants were organized into communes, and almost all means of
productions were controlled by the state.  Distortions in prices and industrial structure were
widespread and enormous. (Lin, Cai and Li 1996)
The Great Leap Forward in the 1958-62 and Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976
represented long lasting disasters interruptive to economic development and destructive to the
cultural heritage of Chinese people.  Without the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution,
output per capita in 1993 would have been double its actual level (Chow and Kwan 1996).
China was ready for reform in 1978 after more than ten years of stagnation of rural
incomes, shortage of foreign exchange, raw materials and many consumer goods, and a widening
technological gap with the rest of the world.  In particular, Chinese leaders were impressed by the
rapid rising of its East Asian neighbors which adopted market principles and export-oriented
policies, and was determined to catch up.   At this time, Chinese economy was largely rural with
two-thirds of the population lived in the countryside, and around 600 commodities allocated
through central plan.  Chinese people enjoyed better health and education status than their
counterpart in low-income countries, with life expectancy at 64 years (1975) and gross secondary
enrollment at 47%.
Rapid Rural Reform and Opening Up (1978-83)
Economic reform in China has been characterized by pragmatism and incrementalism.
China started from easy reforms, and moved later to more complex and politically more difficult
reforms, which happens to be consistent with the logic of learning.  In other word, China has
incorporated learning in the process of reforms.  Even from the beginning, Chinese leaders realized
institutional reform is a long “process” which no other country has ventured through, and the best
strategy is to “cross the river by feeling the stones at the bottom,” or learning-by-doing.
Rural reforms were launched in 1978 by the large increases in the procurement prices for
grains.  And farmers were able to sell above quota output at the market prices.  At the same time,
experiments started at various localities on the household responsibility system (HRS), under which
collectively owned land was assigned to households for up to 15 years (the contractual period was
lengthened several time to fifty years).  In 1981 the central government approved the
implementation of HRS nationwide and by 1984, 99 percent of rural households participated in
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HRS.  Rural reforms were successful with growth in agricultural yields accelerated, and rural
income rose rapidly.
Rural industry developed rapidly as rural reforms created several favorable conditions.
First, income rose and more savings could be invested in rural industries which have higher rate of
returns than farming.  Second, reforms boosted productivity and freed surplus labor and provided a
steady supply of workers for rural industries.  Government provided support to rural industries since
1984 in the forms of easing state control on materials, allowing sub-contracting by urban firms, and
low taxation to township and village enterprises (TVEs).  The share of collectively owned
enterprises grew rapidly: in 1978 these enterprises accounted for 22 percent of industrial output.
This share rose to 30 percent in 1984 and to 36 percent in 1988, where it has remained since.
China opened its doors to foreign trade and investment steadily at an early stage of reforms.
First China reformed its trading system by increasing the numbers of firms allowed to trade
internationally, by lowering tariffs on imports steadily and giving exemptions.  Second, initially
exporters were allowed to retain a portion of foreign exchange receipts.  Government maintained a
realistic exchange rate policy and devalued five times since the reform started.  Interbank market for
foreign exchange was developed and the dual exchange rates were unified at the market rate in
1994.   Third, regulations on foreign direct investment were gradually relaxed. Four special
economic zones (SEZs) were established in 1980, and a fifth was added later, which offered foreign
investors special fiscal, infrastructural and financial incentives.  By 1993, more than 9,000
economic zones were established throughout China, which played important roles in attracting
foreign direct investment, stimulating trade, bringing in advanced technology and upgrading
industries.
Reforms in public finance, financial and enterprise sectors (1984-89)
This period was marked by partial reforms in many areas and a dual-track price/exchange
rate system.   The scope of planning has been gradually reduced, with the number of materials in the
state unified plan decreased from 256 in 1980 to 27 in 1988.   Starting in 1984, dual price approach
was adopted in which the prices of products and materials allocated by the plans were set by the
government, whereas the prices of the same products and materials allocated by non-planning
channels were determined by the market.  This approach allowed decision-making to be determined
at margin by market prices, but at the same time created rampant rent-seeking behavior and
corruption.
 Table A2.1
Share of Goods Sold at State-fixed Prices, 1978-93
(percent)
Year Retail
commodities
Agricultural
goods
Capital goods
1978 97 94 100
1992 10 15 20
1993 5 10 15
Source: Lardy 1994
Fiscal decentralization in China happened in the early 1980s and took the form of a
revenue-sharing system between the central and provincial governments, which is called a contract
responsibility system or “eating in separate kitchens”.   For 15 provinces, revenues were divided
into three types, central-fixed revenues, local-fixed revenues and shared revenues.  During 1980-84
around 80 percent of the shared revenues were remitted to the central government and 20 percent
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retained by the local governments.  Other provinces and cities had adopted a variety of revenue-
sharing methods, after prolonged negotiations with the Central government.  In 1988, fiscal contract
system further increased the revenue share retained by the localities.  The system initially stimulated
the local government’s incentives for tax collection.  However, it gave the localities control over
effective tax rates and tax base, and thus, caused continue erosion of central government’s revenue
and  undermined its ability to use fiscal policy instruments.  From 1978 to 1993, the ratio of total
government revenue to GNP declined from 35 to 13 percent; and the ratio of central government
revenue to total government revenue declined from 51 to 37 percent (Ma 1996).
Reform of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has gone through three phases.  The
first phase (1979-1986) focused on giving a certain amount of autonomy to enterprises in exchange
for their efficiency. New freedoms included a slowly rising share of profits that could be retained
for wages and bonuses and new investment, greater autonomy over production decisions and wages,
adoption of the management responsibility system, and in some cases recruitment of new
management (table A2.2).  Enterprises were able to sell more and more of their products at the
market prices, and benefiting from a dual-track pricing system which allowed better resource
allocation at the margin.  Productivity of firms improved as a result of these reforms even though
the extent of productivity growth is under much debate.
The second phase (1987-1991) focused on the reconstruction of state enterprises’
managerial mechanism.  The government introduced various forms of managerial responsibility
systems, including management contract system for the large and medium-sized enterprises, the
leasing system for small enterprises and experiments on the stockholding system.  By 1987, about
33,000 state enterprises adopted “asset management responsibility system” accounting for 90
percent of SOEs in the same category.  At the same time, enterprise tax burdens were reduced and
“profit-remittance” system was replaced by corporate income taxes.   After 1992, the dominant
view shifted to clarifying the property rights by way of adopting the shareholding system. SOE
reform entered its third phase and “corporatization” became the fashion (1992-present).  Along with
the development of stock market, more and more SOEs are allowed to issue stocks and over 500
firms are listed on China’s two stock exchanges (Xu and Wang, 1996)
Table A2.2
Increased Autonomy for State Enterprises during the 1980s
(percent)
Control rights 1980 1985 1989
Base profit retention rate\a 7 37 39
Marginal profit retention rate\b 11 17 27
Autonomy in production decisions\c 7 35 67
Wage discretion\c 1 9 35
Management responsibility system\c 0 4 88
New management appointed after 1980\c 9 40 94
Note: based on a 1991 retrospective sample survey of SOEs by Chinese Academy of social Sciences
a: Portion of profits that could be retained if profits did not exceed a specified base level.
b: Portion of profits that could be retained if profits exceeded the base level.
c: Share of firms in the sample.
Source: Xu 1996.
Accelerating Reforms after 1992
After a period of retrenchment in 1989-91 due to the Tiananmen square event, the
government accelerated the reform efforts and speed of opening up.  The era of “dual
price/exchange rate” is over.  By 1993, 95 percent of consumer goods are sold at market prices.
The exchange rates were unified at the market rate in January 1994, representing a 20 percent
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depreciation.
Chinese government has long realized that another round of Fiscal reforms is essential to
stem the continued erosion of government revenues. The following reforms were introduced since
1994: (i) simplification of the structure and rate of indirect taxes, with a greatly-expanded VAT as
the centerpiece; (ii) uniform application of domestic enterprise income taxes in place of the
enterprise-specific contracts of the past; (iii) a move to tax-assignment system in 1994 that will
gradually increase the central share of revenues; and (iv) centralization of the administration of
central and shared taxes through establishing a National Tax Service (NTS).  In 1995, in an effort to
improve tax revenue collections, the Government has moved towards reducing and eliminating a
variety of tax exemptions. Duty exemptions for foreign investors were removed and VAT rebates
for exporters were reduced from 14% in 1995 to 9% in early 1996. Following wide-ranging tax
reforms, tax revenues as a share of GDP stabilized in 1996.
SOE reforms are accelerating, as SOEs continue to absorb a disproportionate share of
investment resources, and their lackluster performance has hampered growth and employment
creation.  A 50-point program was adopted to establish a modern enterprise system, the 10,000-
1,000-100-10 program of SOE reforms1 and the enactment of a company law marked the beginning
of a process to enforce market discipline on SOEs and to improve incentives within SOEs.  The
government announced in 1995 that it would retain the 1,000 largest enterprises, and “throw the rest
out to sea”.  After the 15th party Congress in 1997, SOE reform entered a new but hardly a final
stage in converting public enterprise system into one based on market competition and profit
oriented management.  The strategy is two folds. First, consolidate and concentrate resources in
large profitable SOEs, and converting them into shareholding stock companies.  And second, divest
inefficient and non-strategic SOEs while avoiding social and political disruption.  Over 800
companies are listed on China’s two stock exchanges by early 1998, and thousands are going
through ownership diversification, corporatization, divestiture, mergers, leasing, joint ventures,
conversion to collectives and exit.
Financial sector reforms in China started in 1979 and initially transformed the state mono-
banking system into one consisting of 4 state commercial banks and a central bank (1979-85).
From 1986 onwards, market mechanisms were introduced in to the financial system on an
experimental basis.  The market for interbank loans was developed gradually and became the major
means of adjusting loanable funds across regions.  The Central Bank gradually phased out direct
controls over the allocation of investment resources and moved towards a greater reliance on
commercial criteria. The Government has: (i) approved several laws governing the PBC and the
banking and insurance sectors; (ii) eliminated certain preferential lending rates in an effort to
rationalize the structure of interest rates,  and adjusted interest rates more frequently; (iii) increased
the autonomy of the state commercial banks in making lending decisions; (iv) introduced asset-
liability ratios for nationwide commercial banks as a complementary indirect instrument of
monetary policy; and (v) implemented the divestiture of NBFIs from banks.  These reforms set the
stage for the introduction of indirect instruments of macroeconomic policy, and ultimately lead to a
more efficient allocation of investment resources.   From 1998, the Central Bank has started to use
open market operations and other indirect monetary policy instruments to adjust money supply.  To
deal with the mounting bad-loans in the state banking system, the government has recently decided
to issue $50 billion state bonds to re-capitalize the state commercial banks.
                                               
1 10,000 large and medium-sized SOEs are to adopt modern accounting standards, 1000 large SOEs are to adopt new
state asset administration regulations, 100 large SOEs are to be corporatized, and 10 municipalities are to
undergo comprehensive reforms.  In fact, 18 municipalities have been selected for these reforms.
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Impact of reforms and performance of Chinese economy
China has experienced the most rapid growth among any large country in the world
during its economic reform since 1978.  In less than two decades, it has achieved what took other
countries centuries to accomplish.   Its per capita income first doubled between 1978-1987, and
then double again in nine years between 1987-1996 (figure A2.1).  Real GDP growth has
averaged 9.3 percent a year, and inflation 6.9 percent a year.2 Average consumption more than
doubled, and over 170 million of the 270 million Chinese living in absolute poverty in 1978 were
raised above the minimum poverty threshold.  A number of key policies made possible these
remarkable achievements. The household responsibility system and partial liberalization of
agricultural prices helped raise agricultural production and rural incomes, especially in the early
years of reforms.  Liberal policies toward non-state enterprises and a gradual introduction of
market forces into the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector provided a powerful catalyst for rapid
growth in industrial output, exports and employment.  The “open-door” policy toward trade and
foreign investment supported brisk export growth averaging 13 percent over 1980-95, and large
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, reaching $48 billion in 1996 and $37 billion in 1997.
For the first time since the beginning of the reforms in 1978, the authorities were able to
cool an overheated economy without jeopardizing growth.  GDP growth subsided from a frenetic
13.5% in 1993 to 11.8% in 1994, before descending further to 10.2% in 1995.  Inflation declined
steadily from a peak of 25.2% in October 1994 (on an twelve-month basis) to 8.3% in 1995, and to
near-zero in early 1998.
Figure A2.1.
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Key Challenges
                                               
2 As measured by the average annual percentage increase in the retail price index.  Unless otherwise noted,
average growth rates are calculated using the least-squares method.
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Despite China's achievements since 1978, the Government faces significant challenges over the
medium-term, which can be broadly divided into two sets: (i) achieving sustainable growth within a
stable macroeconomic environment; and (ii) reducing poverty and maintaining a relatively
egalitarian distribution of income and wealth.
· Sustainable Growth and Stability.  China's economy has experienced a strongly cyclical
pattern of growth, with periodic episodes of overheating and inflation followed by
contractionary policies leading to sharp declines in growth.  Large aggregate public sector
deficits3 estimated at 11.5% of GDP over 1987-93 developed, driven by weak tax collections,
SOE investment demand and the political commitment to support loss-making SOEs.  This
fueled inflationary pressures which, in the absence of indirect macroeconomic policy
instruments, could only be held in check by the application of blunt administrative measures.
The fundamental causes of macroeconmic instability remain, even though the recent cycle
(1994-95) of overheating was cooled down through a skillful use of administrative measures,
and “soft landing” was achieved.  Growth is further hampered by bottlenecks in infrastructure
and energy.  In addition, development activities increasingly strain the environment, and
some of China's cities are now among the most polluted in Asia.
 
· Managing financial risks and averting crisis. State-owned bank are burdened with bad-loans
accounting for about 20 percent of its total assets.  It needs to be re-capitalized if financial
crisis is to be prevented.  Public finances, already weakened by difficulties in revenue
collection, will continue to face pressures, both from the support of SOEs as well as from the
long-term need for substantial expenditure increases in key areas such as infrastructure,
health and education. As thousands of SOEs are going bankrupt (6000 cases in 1996) and
unemployment soaring (12million workers were laid off in 1997), there is an urgent need to
establish a market oriented social safety net, covering health, pension and unemployment
benefits.
 
· Poverty and Income Distribution. Despite extraordinary growth over the reform period,
according to official statistics some 70 million people remain in absolute poverty, mostly in
remote rural areas, and increasingly so in urban areas.  However, China’s relatively flat
income distribution implies that these estimates are very sensitive to the choice of poverty
lines, and a large proportion of the population can be considered “near-poor” by international
standards.  Although urban-rural income disparities declined somewhat in 1995, these
disparities remain substantial.  Together with regional income growth differentials, these
income disparities feed migration pressures.  The "floating" population of unregistered rural
migrants living in urban areas is estimated at 80 to 120 million people.
Looking ahead, China is in a good position to keep a balance between economic reform,
learning and institution building, and economic growth.  In the past 17 years, China has managed to
build learning into the process of a historical transition from a planned to a market economy, and
maintained the highest growth rates among large developing countries.  In order to tackle the
daunting tasks and challenges China now faces, it needs to do more in combining learning and
reforms, especially learning from the positive and negative experiences of its neighboring countries.
                                               
3 The aggregate public sector deficit measures the excess of expenditures over revenues for the
consolidated government and state-enterprise system.
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Table A2.3.  Chronology of Economic Reforms in China
Trade and investment reforms
“Opening up”  (very successful)
Fiscal decentralization and tax reforms (on-going
with mixed results)
 continued
opening up, both
export and import
increase
decentralize
export
rights,
experiment
on SEZs and
open cities
Opening to
foreign
investment, FDI
soared,
technology has
been flowing in.
“Revenue
sharing”
system
experiment
ed since
1980
Revenue
sharing system
were revised
and made
national in
1988
Problems
with
declining
revenue
/GDP ratio
Tax and expenditure assignment
system implemented since 1994.
pension reforms designed and
implemented partially.
Price and exchange rate reforms: (successful)
Raising prices
for agricultural
products
Prices were allowed to float for
many products in excess of planned
quota.
Dual exchange rate allowed
The scope of plan has
been reduced gradually
Foreign exchange swap
markets allowed
Exchange
rates were
merged at
the market
by 1/1/94
90% of
prices
liberalized
Current account
convertibility achieved
smoothly in Dec 1996
Rural reforms  (successful) Reforms of SOEs (slow and unfinished)
 Local
experiments on
rural household
responsibility
system (HRS)
Experiments
with HRS
successful.
Implemented
to the whole
nation
Benefit the poor
greatly and
reinforce the
determination
for reforms
Experiments on
managerial
responsibility
systems with
some efficiency
gains
Bankruptcy law
passed and
started, 100+
cases each year
More bankruptcies (6,232 cases
in1996), more mergers and
acquisitions, experiments on sales,
corporatization  and  small
privatization.  12 million state
workers were made redundant.
Reform of Banking systems, and development of
capital markets (slow and unfinished)
Corporatization
started, foreign
advice sought
on both
banking and
capital market
Two
stock
exchan-
ges
opened
More
regulatio-ns
passed;
more
companies
listed on
stock
exchanges
(800+ by
1998)
Learning and
training on
open market
operations.
Laws on
banking
passed.
Some state
banks are
insolvent.
Central bank
started open
market operations.
Some foreign
banks allowed to
conduct RMB
business.
Competition was
introduced.  But
some state banks
remain insolvent.
1978 1980 1983 1984-- 1990 1993 1995 1996-present
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Chile
History
Occupied by the Spanish in 1536, Chile became a Spanish colony until 1819. The country
was not densely populated by aboriginal cultures, and given the mixing behavior of the Spanish,
Chilean society is today ethnically homogeneous. Also, the country was not provided with easy
access to gold and silver ores, which condemned it to be a poor and marginal colony in the
context of the great Spanish empire. This position would change after independence. In 1819,
Chile declared independence, and immediately went through several institutional experiments
from quasi monarchy to federalism, until in 1930 a strong presidential system was established.
Unlike its neighboring countries, until 1973 Chile enjoyed a lasting democracy with only a short
parenthesis during the late 1920’s.
After the independence of the former Spanish colonies, the region was open to free trade.
Chile’s privileged geographical position in the south Pacific gave the country a leading role in the
new trade routes, exporting commodities like wheat and silver; and later, at the turn of the century
nitrate and copper. The Great Depression hit the country particularly hard as most of its revenue
came from Nitrate exports and its price plummeted not only as a result of the Depression, but by
the developing of synthetic nitrates by the Germans. As a result the country embarked in a inward
looking development strategy that relied in an entrepreneurial state and import substitution. There
was relative success as an industrial base was created and GDP growth rates averaged around
4.6% between 1950-1971.
Extreme Liberalism 1973-1981
After a brief socialist experiment that was violently ended with a coup d’etat in 1973 a
military regime introduced a package of extreme liberal reforms. Trade reforms included the
quick elimination of al non-tariff barriers, and the reduction of tariffs that averaged nearly 100%
in 1973 to a flat 10% for all goods by 1979. In the agricultural sector the regime returned 30% of
the land that had been legally expropriated to their original owners, 20% was auctioned to no
rural residents, and about 30% was assigned to peasants. This created a very active land market
that would later be the base for the development of a new agricultural export sector. Additionally,
the capital account was also liberalized, and in the exchange market a crawling peg system was
adopted. Furthermore, banks that previously had been bought by the state were privatized and
controls over the banking system were minimized. Finally, a tax reform ended with cascading
taxes, by introducing a global 16% value added tax (VAT).
In all, the very fast and “neutral” openness of the economy left the country in a very
vulnerable state to foreign shocks. The negative effects of the first oil shock were multiplied in
the Chilean economy as the GDP fell 13% in 1975. It was expected that exports would rapidly
respond to the trade reforms incentives, however it was the imports that promptly responded,
increasing very speedily more than triplicating by 1980. Thus, there were strong disincentives to
production in the country, investment fell below historical levels to 16%, and it was covered
mostly by foreign debt instead of national savings. Industrial product was in 1979 8% lower than
in 1974. Also, as exports were not growing as fast as imports, the Current Account deficit, which
was being covered by debt, peaked to 18% of GDP in 1981, one of the highest in developing
nations.
In 1979, in an effort to control inflation, the nominal exchange rate was frozen, hoping to
tag national inflation to international levels. All the attention was placed in inflation. By 1982
local inflation was similar to international levels, but the real exchange rate had strongly
appreciated, and the foreign debt had duplicated in three years. In this context of severe
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macroeconomic disequilibriums the economy faced the second oil shock.
Pragmatic Export-Driven Growth 1982-1989
The second oil shock had three strong manifestations in the Chilean economy. First,
capital flows that had reached 18% of GDP in 1981, were reduce to one half of that in 1982, and
later one fourth in 1983. Second, the increase in the interest rates made more expensive the
service of a recently doubled debt. Finally, the terms of trade were worsened, led by a strong
decrease in the international price of copper. As a result, 1982 experienced a negative growth of
GDP of 14%, and unemployment rates rose to almost 30%. The regime had to respond to the
political turmoil that followed. Tariffs were momentarily raised to 35% and the exchange rate
was devaluated in a crawling peg scheme. Imports responded immediately reducing in 1983 to
less than one half of their 1981 level. Exports lagged, but started to grow specially after 1986.
The economy grew at a fast pace, but most of the initial inertia was just recovery and full
utilization of installed capacity. On the other hand, investment kept low like in the previous
period, only starting to grow by the end of the regime.
An assessment of the military regime leaves many negative marks. For the whole 1973-
1989 period the economy grew at a disappointing average of 2.6%. Industrial product practically
did not grow. In 1989 real wages and minimum wages stood at a level lower than 1970. The
“neutral” liberalization approach put the incentives on the export of goods were there was natural
comparative advantages, not acquired, thus most of the exports since have been resource
intensive. There was a severe worsening in the distribution of income, official consumer surveys
for CPI construction reveal that from 1969 to 1987 the richest quintile increased its share of
consumption from 44.5% to 54.9%. Also, the fast liberalization, as expected cause firms to be
more efficient, that is in 1989 the surviving industrial sector was more efficient, but smaller. On
the positive end, a financial sector was developed during the regime, which now has more
controls after the 1982 crisis. Also, different exports grew significantly diminishing the historical
dependence in the copper exports. While in 1974 non copper exports accounted for only 32.7% of
the value of total exports, in 1989 this share was 22.6%. Finally, although the fashion and timing
of the trade liberalization is very arguable, it left a country outward looking ready to base it
growth in the export sector.
Export-Driven Growth and the “Social Debt” 1990 - 1995
With the return of democracy in 1990, the export-driven growth model did not change.
However, the government recognized that during the previous regime there was very little
spending in social programs, it recognized a “social debt”. The period is characterized by very
strong growth, with an average GDP growth of 9.6%. Export not only grew at a similar rate, but
were diversified in its components and their destinations. By 1996 non copper exports amounted
for 60% of the value of the country’s total exports.
The most important reform of the period was agreed with the military regime and it
consisted of granting the Central Bank independence from the executive power, thus guaranteeing
independent monetary policy. The Bank informs agents by the end of the year its goals for next
year’s inflation, and it has gained complete credibility by reaching the goal each year, reducing
inflation each year. The foreign exchange have been liberalized, but they are overlooked by the
Central Bank which has a preestablished “ceiling” and “floor” for the foreign currency trading,
that if overpassed will cause the Bank to intervene. Tariffs were further reduced to a flat 11% in
1991, however different preferential trade agreements signed with countries like Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, etc., have caused average tariff to stand even lower.
In this context of high growth, poverty has decreased sharply in Chile, while the official
poverty head count ratio was 44.6% in 1987, by 1994 it had been reduced o 28.5%. However,
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important challenges await for Chile. The economy has to reduce present Current Account
deficits, increase the value added of its exports. For the latter, it must create a stock of human
capital able to manufacture more technology intensive exports.
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Brazil
History
Over 1.5 million indigenous people, belonging to various tribes and speaking different languages,
inhabited in Brazil when the Portuguese arrived in 1500. The Spanish colonial control lasted
about three centuries. The Spanish authority provoked the anti-colonial movement when it tried to
impose a strict tax system and a law prohibiting Brazilian manufacture.  In 1822, Brazil gained
independence in the form of monarchy. In 1824, the first constitution was promulgated, a
constitutional monarchy was established with three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial.
In the second half of the 19th century, the immigrants from other European countries, especially
United Kingdom, helped the country creating a domestic market with local commerce and
industry. Coffee plantation was one of the major economic activities. Dom Pedro II was crowned
in 1841, but in 1889 a federal republic was constituted and the royal family banned from the
country.
Economic Miracle (1960s-1970s)
The military leadership, who supported President Getulio Vargas (1930-45), saw the importance
of industrial development. Motivated by this aspiration, the military officer corps seized power in
the March 1964 and controlled the country for two decades. Import substitution industrialization
(ISI) was the major strategy of economic development. This inward-looking strategy was
supported by the advantage of rich natural resources, such as arable land, metalliferous ores (iron
and aluminum), livestock, wood and hydroelectricity. The country earned the reputation of being
a "miracle economy" in the late 1960s when double-digit annual growth rates were recorded and
the structure of the economy underwent rapid change. Brazil developed clear comparative
advantage in agricultural product (coffee, soybeans, sugar, orange, tobacco, and cocoa), in
livestock products (meat, poultry, and leather footwear), in wood product pulp, paper, veneer and
plywood), and mineral products (iron, steel, and aluminum).
External Shocks and Political Opening Up (1974-1984)
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The highly centralized military government showed its inability to meet the challenge in the
seventies and eighties, such as the oil shocks over 1973-74 and over 1979-80, the increases in real
interest rates, the 1982 debt crisis and resulting cut-off of foreign credit and foreign direct
investment. The external shocks revealed the internal weakness of the ISI strategy and the
economic miracle disappeared. On the economic policy aspect, the military government kept a
high spending program in order to buy the support from the Congress. On the political aspect,
fearful of the results of the repression of the political opposition, general Ernesto Geisel, president
(1974-79), began to open up the politics to civilian groups, and the process was continued by the
succeeding president, general João Figueiredo (1979-1985). In 1981, a multiple-party democratic
election ended the military regime. Although the worsening of economic performance led to the
political change, political transition could not save the economy instantly. The external shocks, in
combination with poor management of public finances and heavy state intervention resulted in
large fiscal deficits at state and federal levels. The economic policy in the first half of 1980s was
to generate enough trade surplus to pay foreign debt. The Brazilian economy run into recession
right in the year of 1981. Since 1981, Brazil's economic performance has been poor in
comparison to its potential. The average annual rate of GDP growth was only 1.5 percent between
1980 and 1993. In addition, Brazilian income distribution, already poor, become worse in 1980s.
Short-lived Stabilization Plans (1986-1991)
To finance the huge deficit gap, the government tried expansionary monetary policy. Hyper-
inflation occurred. Monthly interest rate skyrocketed from 3% in late 1970s to 50% in the mid-
1994. To stabilize the economy, the government created a sophisticated system of price
indexation. Between 1986 and 1991, the government tested five unsuccessful plans to stabilize
the economy and the name of the currency was changed four times. All these stabilization
programs used price-freezing measures.
Structural Reforms (1990-1993)
The government come into power in March 1990 introduced significant structural reforms,
including trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization. The average nominal tariffs were
reduced from 32% in 1990 to 14% in July 1993, the import prohibitions on 1800 goods were
abolished, and most quota restrictions were eliminated in four years. As for economic
deregulation, the government eliminated the domestic production and distribution quotas,
licensing, and prior approval of investment plans. The privatization program started in 1991.
Privatization has completed in steel sector and in most of the fertilizer and petrochemical
industries, and a broader private participation in infrastructure, such as railway and ports, was
introduced through sale of state-own equity. The adjustment caused the deep recession over 1990-
1992, then the economic recovery started in 1993.
The Real Plan (1994-present)
When Fernando Henrique Cardoso become the financial minister in May 1993, he made it clear
that economic stabilization would be sought not by price-freezes but by a gradual pre-announced
program.  His plan is now known as the Real Plan. It was based on market forces, and  composed
of two major steps. The first priority was to eliminates the public-sector deficit. The 1988
Brazilian constitution obligated the government to make transfers to state and municipalities, and
to protect jobs of public workers. When the government proposed amendments in order to cut
public expenditures, the Congress resisted the government’s proposal. Then the government
proposed to set up the Fundo Social de Emergência (FSE), the Congress finally approved the FSE
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in February 1994. The second step was to introduce the transitional unit of account, the Unidade
Real de Valor (URV), as a mechanism to avoid a prize freeze while de-indexing from the past
inflation. One URV roughly equals to one US dollar. Prices were converted to the URV and
hence kept stable. On the market, prices denominated in cruzeiros reais (CR) would increase in
line with the inflation. Wages and tariffs were also converted into the URVs and then into Reais.
All parties knew that one real, the new currency, would equal to one URV and that the URV
would equal to CR2,750 exactly on July 1, 1994. In this way the introduction of the new currency
would break with the indexation mechanism which automatically transmitted the inflation into
current and future rates of inflation. The Real Plan achieved its goal of controlling inflation right
in the year of 1994. Monthly inflation rate dropped from 50% in June to 2% in the fourth quarter
of 1994. The annual inflation rate has been reduced from 5,000% at the end of  June 1994 to 30%
in July 1995, then to an annualized rate about 15% in 1996. Growth rates were satisfactory in
1994 and 1995, 5.8 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively. Mr. Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
master of the real plan, become the Brazilian President in October 1994 and remains popular
today.
After the initial success of the Real Plan, the government re-introduced reforms in trade and
privatization. A common external tariff in the rang of 0 and 20 percent went into effect among the
MERCOSUR countries on January 1995. Privatization program was extended into the sectors of
energy (power and natural gas), banking, and telecommunication. Trade liberalization and
privatization, which started in early 1990s, also led to high labor productivity. Labor productivity
growth rate per year between 1990 and 1995 was 6-7% compared with approximately 1.4% per
year between 1986 and 1990.
Remained Issues
(1) The fall of inflation boosted domestic demand and push the trade balance into red in 1994.
The Mexico crisis in December 1994 fueled the fears that no enough external capital would be
available to finance the trade deficit. The government first temporarily halted trade liberalization
process by raising sharply the tariffs for cars and other consumer durable goods, and then
tightened credit and raised interest rates. The rising of interest rates caused troubles for both
public and banking sectors. While the inflation rate was high, the government could cut
expenditures by delaying payment, enjoying the benefit of “inflation tax”. At a low inflation rate,
the public sector could no longer use this mechanism to cut cost. As for the banking sector, a high
inflation means a low (even negative) real interest rate of deposit, hence a low cost. When price
stabilized and interest become high, banks had to pay a high cost for the deposit. This caused
banking crisis, which was further exacerbated by non-performing loans. (2) The insolvency of
several state-own banks during the 1995 banking crisis removed the financial sources from the
states. Their deficit and debt increased. (3) Spending cut is key for the success of the Real Plan.
The government met strong resistance in the congress when it proposed reform on tax, social
security, administrative systems. Now the Real Plan relies on an over-valued exchange rate,
which in the long run is harmful. (4) Even though the per capita income is high, the quality of
Brazilian education is poor. Teachers are underpaid. Dropout rates are high. Of the children who
start primary school, only 60% reach grade 4, 43% grade 8. This is inadequate for the
requirements of an industrial state.
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Colombia
History
Colombia declared its independence from Spain in 1810 while the Napoleon’s French forces
occupied Spain. After the defeat of Napoleon, Spain tried to restore its colonial control. Under the
leadership of Simon Bolivar, Colombia won the war against the loyalists and gained the full
independence in 1819. Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador formed the Republic of Gran
Colombia, and Panama was annexed in 1821. Then Venezuela and Ecuador ceded from the
republic and become independent countries in 1830. Panama, supported by the USA, declared
independence during the war over 1899-1902. The Colombian domestic politics was
characterized by the rivalry between the Conservatives and the Liberals. After “La Violancia”
over 1948-58, which claimed 250,000 lives, the two parties decided to settle their differences by
forming the National Front. From 1957 to 1973 the two parties rotated the presidency. This
power-sharing system between the two parties excluded other sections of the population from the
domestic politics. Guerrilla groups were formed against the government in mid-1960s. Only some
of the guerrilla groups were disarmed in 1991 after the cease-fire agreements were reached in
1989. The negotiations with the two best armed and most extreme groups, the Fueraz Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN),  have
dragged on without any results.
Coffee Bonanza (1970-1979)
Colombia was for many years heavily dependent on the export of coffee even though it has
abundant natural resources, such as agricultural land, water of irrigation, energy resources (oil,
natural gas, and coal), and mineral resources (nickel, gold, and emeralds). The GDP growth was
at 6% annually on average during 1970s thanks to the more than fourfold coffee price increase
over a period of two years, which is known as the coffee bonanza of 1975-80.
World Recession and a Stable Growth (1980-1985)
During the first half of 1980s, the world economy run into recession. The Latin American debt
crisis erupted in 1982. The growth of Colombian economy slowed down. Unlike other Latin
American countries, Colombia still enjoyed a healthy, albeit not high, economic growth rate.
Healthy Growth and Austerity Program (1986-1990)
Colombia achieved high growth rate during the second half of the 1980s. Its prudent and gradual
approach to macroeconomic management contributed to this unique stable economic growth.
Unlike other Latin American countries, Colombia has avoided major debt re-scheduling after the
debt crisis. In 1985-86, Colombia pursued a IMF style austerity program to curb inflation, which
was also served as a quid pro quo for new multilateral and commercial bank financing. The IMF
and the World Bank together monitored Colombia’s policy and helped Colombia to get from
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commercial banks $1 billion and $1.65 billion loans respectively in 1988 and 1989.
In addition to the prudent macroeconomic austerity policy, several other factors helped the
growth. (1) Poor weather in 1986 Brazil cut the coffee supply, and Colombia benefited from this
coffee price boom in the world market. (2) The growing of oil industry after the discovery of
large oil fields at Cusiana and Cupiagua has changed Colombia’s export pattern. Oil output
tripled in the 1980s, and oil export earnings surpass those of  coffee export for the first time in
1990. (3) Export of no-oil sectors, such as mining, grew at a rapid speed.
Reform (1990-1994)
The macroeconomic policy alone could not increase productivity in the long term. The
government started structural reforms in 1990. (1) On trade policy, the government cut the
average tariff from 40 percent at the end of 1989 to less than 12 percent at the end of 1993. (2) On
the resource relocation policy, the government allowed foreign ownership of financial institution
and free entry into all segments of the market. (3) The central bank gained greater autonomy
through a new central bank law passed by the congress. (4) Exchange rate was unified on January
24, 1994. (4) Reforms were also conducted in other fields: elimination of monopoly, reduction of
labor rigidity, and decentralization of government.
The Plan of Social Leap (1994-Present)
In 1994, the government announced the 1994-1998 national development plan -- the Salto Social
(the Social Leap) -- which covers four critical areas of action: social development,
competitiveness of the economy, environment, and decentralization and institutional
strengthening. The government, encouraged by the oil boom, increased the spending on social
programs and infrastructure. The position of the non-financial public sector switched from a
surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP in 1994 to a 0.6 percent of deficit in 1995, because less tax was
collected, coffee price dropped, and spending increased.
Remained Issues
(1) One of the major international economic activities related to Colombia is the trade in illegal
drugs, particularly cocaine. No reliable statistics is available for this. It was estimated that 75% of
the world cocaine is from Colombia. Illegal drug counts for 7% of GDP. However the social costs
have clearly outweighed the possible benefits. The drug money provides funds for corruption, and
it also causes troubles for making of monetary policy and for managing of the exchange rate. (2)
The earnings from both oil and coffee exports are subject to world oil market shocks which have
happened several times since the 1970s. The ambitious spending plan for development could
become a burden once the oil revenue is negatively affected.
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India
Chronology of Development Strategy and Recent Economic Reforms
Development Strategy before 1980s
India’s approach to economic development had until recently been highly interventionist and
inward-oriented.  In the mid-1950s, India initiated the trend among newly independent nations in
selecting the economic strategy of state-led industrialization or SLI, characterized by economic
planning, high protectionism, and extensive state regulation of the economy.  In most of the four
decades following independence, India had relied heavily on a complex system of industrial
licensing, high protection against imports, and extensive government intervention in financial
intermediation.
The choice of SLI in India and elsewhere is understandable given the choices facing the leaders
of developing countries at the end of World War II.  By 1949, only a handful of countries had
convertible currencies, and global trade was managed through national governments, and
accounted for a small fraction of national income. At the same time the industrialization of the
Soviet Union also point to a model of development based on state-ownership and extensive
barriers to trade. (Bajpai and Sachs, 1996)
Economic development before the June 1991 Crisis
During the 1980s, the government started to liberalize trade, industrial and financial policies.
Export incentives were improved by subsidies, tax concessions and the depreciation of the
currency.  These measures helped GDP growth to accelerate to over 5 percent annually during the
1980s and reduced poverty more rapidly.  However, tariffs continued to be extremely high and
quantitative restrictions remained pervasive.  State owned banks continued to dominate the
banking system and public enterprises (which generate 17 percent of GDP) continued to operate
very inefficiently.
India borrowed heavily from abroad, especially in the late 1980s.  Much of the borrowing was
from commercial banks and a large part was the Non-resident Indian balances, which were short
term capital inflows at high interest rates.  In 1990 and 1991, increased political risk, overly
expansionary macroeconomic policy and a sharp decline in remittances from overseas Indian
workers, led to outflows of short-term capital, putting extreme pressure on India’s foreign
exchange reserve.  By mid-1991, India’s foreign exchange reserve had declined to about US$1
billion (two weeks of imports) in June 1991, putting the country on the verge of defaulting on its
external debt.  This serious balance of payment crisis was the cause of the start of India’s market
liberalization in 1991.
Stabilization and Structural reforms since 1991
In June 1991, the new Indian government undertook major steps in stabilizing and liberalizing the
economy.  The reforms adopted in India in 1991 had four main elements:
1.  Immediate stabilization measures, notably a 19 percent devaluation of the rupee and increase
in interest rates designed to restore confidence and reverse the short-term capital outflow.
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2.  Fiscal consolidation aimed at reducing the central government deficit from 8.5% of GDP in
1990/91 to 5% in 1992/93.
3.  Mobilization of substantial exceptional financing from the IMF, the World Bank, and
bilateral donors to maintain a minimum level of imports
4.  Initiation of major structural reforms. The early emphasis of the reforms was on industrial
deregulation and trade liberalization, in a push to reduce drastically licensing requirements
for investment and imports.  Subsequently, the focus turned to tax reform, further trade
liberalization (including reduction of tariffs), and financial sector reforms.
Structural Reforms
a)  Trade and Exchange Regime Reforms
Until the recent reforms, India’s trade policy was geared toward self-reliance through import
substitution policies, with pervasive restrictions and extremely high import tariffs.  In June 1991,
India’s average import weighted tariff rate of 87 percent was the highest in the world.  Trade
reforms were preceded by a substantial devaluation of the rupee, which led to a 15 percent
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate between 1991 and 1992. The reforms aimed at
reducing the level and dispersion of tariffs and easing quantitative restrictions.  Several rounds of
reforms since 1991s have lifted all licensing restrictions on imports of intermediate and capital
good, liberalized marginally imports of consumer goods, and reduced maximum tariffs for non-
consumer goods to 40 percent. In parallel, the exchange-rate regime has been liberalized, and full
convertibility has been established for current account transactions.   Despite these reforms,
protection remains high by international standards, especially in consumer goods.   India’s import
weighted average tariff of 27 percent, for example, is significantly higher than that of  East Asian
and Latin American competitors where import weighted tariffs are in the 10-15 percent range.
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Table A2.4
India:  Tariff Structure,  1990-1996
1990/91 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Mean and Standard Diviations
Whole economy 128 94 71 55 42
(41) (34) (30) (25) (21)
  Agricultural Products 106 59 39 31 26
  Mining .. .. 71 48 37
  Consumer goods 142 92 76 59 43
  Intermediates 133 104 77 59 45
  Capital goods 109 86 58 42 35
Imported weighted average
Whole Economy 87 64 47 33 27
  Agricultural Products 70 30 25 17 15
  Mining .. .. 33 31 30
  Consumer goods 164 144 33 48 39
  Intermediates 117 55 40 31 24
  Capital goods 97 76 50 38 30
Notes: Standard Diviations are in parentheses. In 1990/91 and 1992/93, mining is included in
intermediates.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of India and World Bank estimates.  Also in
Ahluwalia 1996.
b) Investment Reforms
Discouraged by a tight regulatory regime as well as the highly distorted economy, capital flows to
India have historically been low.  Direct investment was limited, averaging around $200 million a
year over 1985-90.  A key component of the economic reform program launched in July 1991
was the adoption of a much more open approach to foreign investment.  At the outset, approval
for direct investment participation up to 51% in priority areas was made automatic, while the
criteria for approval were liberalized more generally.  In February 1992, it was announced that
Indian firms in good standing would be allowed to raise funds through equity and convertible
bond issues in euromarkets.  In September 1992, registered Foreign Institutional Investors (FII’s)
were allowed to purchase both equity and debt securities directly on local markets.  To encourage
these flows further, in March 1993 budget the tax on interest and dividend income on FII
holdings was set at 20 percent while capital gains tax was set at 30 percent on investment held for
less than one year and 10 percent thereafter.  The response to these liberalization measures was
strong:  total FDI and portfolio investment rose to $5.1 billion in 1994/1995, from $585 million in
1992/93 and $148 million in 1991/92.  (Charles Collyns, 1995)
c)  Industrial Sector
Measures to deregulate the industrial sectors included removing investment licensing
requirements in most industrial sectors, with the exception of only a few areas such as petroleum,
coal, and agroprocessing.  Anti-trust legislation was amended to eliminate the restraints to large
firms’ expansion, diversification, merger and acquisition.  Many price controls (for example, on
steel, aluminum, and cement) were eliminated.
These reforms have produced positive results for the Indian private sector.  Investment picked up
significantly in 1994/95, and output in most areas (and particularly, in automobiles, consumer
electronics ) has increased rapidly.  However, remaining licensing restrictions used mainly to
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protect small scale industry, including agro-industry have considerable negative repercussions.
Moreover, in many instances, investing in India remains difficult due to state-level regulations
and administrative burden.
d)  Tax Reforms
Before 1991, India’s tax base was highly dependent on customs revenues, and had multiplicity of
high rates falling on a narrow base.  The principal feature of the tax reform has was the general
lowering of tax rates.  The structure of indirect tax rates has also been improved.  In the 1994-95
budget, taxes on corporate income were unified at 40 percent, from 45 percent for  widely held
companies and 55 percent for branches of foreign banks.  In addition, a major reform of excises
was implemented to make it more closely resemble a value-added tax, and the coverage of
MODVAT (modified VAT) was extended to include manufacturing sector as well as some
services for the first time.  The 1995-96 budget further reduced peak excises and emphasized
simplification, compliance, and lower rates. These reforms have considerably simplified India’s
tax system and made it possible for the Central Government to improve tax administration.
The Effect of Reforms on Growth and the Poor
Since India did not have the inflation, external debt, and social inequalities as severe as those in
Latin America, it was able to stabilize the economy more rapidly and at a lower cost.  Indeed,
India’s economic recovery from adjustment programs has been both rapid and robust. Economic
growth declined sharply in response to the devaluation and contractionary fiscal and monetary
policies adopted in June 1991 -- from over 5 percent in 1990-91, GDP growth declined to less
than one percent in 1991-92.  However, helped by an unprecedented sequence of good monssons,
a relaxation in fiscal policies, and a strong supply-response to the reforms, growth accelerated to
5 percent in 1992-94, 6 percent in 1994-95, and 7 percent in 1995-96.  Since growth was driven
mainly by exports and private investment, the recovery did not put pressure on inflation or the
external accounts.
Five years of stabilization and reforms have positively impacted the poor mainly through two
channels,.  First, the sharp devaluation of the rupee and the decline in the protection of
manufacturing have improved the agricultural terms of trade.  Second, the reduction in the anti-
export bias implicit in the pre-1991 regime has led to a rapid expansion of labor intensive
exports--which can be a key factor in employment generation and poverty reduction.  There are
reasons for concern as well.  Significant increases in the prices of key commodities such as
fertilizers, rice sugar, cotton and gasoline can negatively impact the living standards of the poor.
In addition, increases in inflation caused by rapid monetary growth in 1993-94 and 1994-95
(because of monetization of capital flows) and increases in the prices of key agricultural products
(result of higher issue prices and the delayed effect of the sharp devaluation) have caused fears
that the burden of adjustment may have fallen disproportionately on the poor.
Though largely successful, the process of economic reform in India is not complete. The annual
report of the Ministry of Finance on the economy developments in 1994-95 highlight some of the
remaining challenges.  Without substantial improvements in public savings, the economy will not
be able to accommodate higher levels of investment needed to sustain growth and reduce poverty.
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Korea:   Major Reform Events
In retrospect, Korea’s development has passed four main stages. Unlike several of the larger
economies in East Asia, which evolved from protectionism, inward-looking trade regimes toward
relatively open economies, Korea did not have a sufficiently large population to contemplate a
strategy other than export-led development, which consists importing raw materials and intermediate
goods for processing and export with value-added.  It development experience shows that export
orientation, effective public policy intervention, and financial liberalization are the center of fast
economic development over the past three decades.
War and Construction (1950-60)
After World War II, devastating South Korea was almost entirely dependent on US aid
for Korea’s reconstruction in 1953.4  Some argued that the significance of US aid have helped
Korea to prepare for an industrial takeoff in 1960s.. The development efforts in the 1950s
included several false starts; progress was made in reconstruction, including the restoration of
transportation and communication networks. The government also completed a land reform
program that has stalled before the war.
                                               
4 Aid financed nearly 70% of total imports between 1953 and 1961 and 75% of total fixed capital formation
(See Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim and Chung-in Moon, Nov. 1990, pp. 3)
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Export Promotion and Industrial Takeoff (1961-73)
Under President Park, aggressive promotion of export was combined with classic import
protection at home. Korean policymakers maintained close control over trade, exchange and
financial policy as well as aspects of industrial decisionmaking.  In contrast to other controlled
economies, they used these instruments to pursue primary objective of export growth. The
instruments included multiple exchange rate support, direct cash payment, permission to retain
foreign exchange earnings, tariff exemption to exporters. Support for exports was pervasively
channeled through the state-controlled banking system; banks increasingly used export performance
as the criterion of creditworthiness.  Moreover, major devaluation of 1961 and 1964, along with
other supporting policies, also provided a strong initial impetus for export growth.
As a result, Korea’s outward-looking trade strategy contributed significantly to the overall
expansion of the economy.  It also led to increasing confidence in Government’s ability to initiate
and direct national development strategy. Buoyed by its past success, the Government next turned to
more direct efforts to accelerate structural change and plunged into the battle to promote heavy
industries.
Government Intervention through Heavy and Chemical Industries Drive (1973-79)
The shift from general export promotion to a sectoral development strategy, focused on
heavy and chemical industries (HCIs), was announced in 1973 by the late president Park. It
represented a major change in policy in favor of specific industrial targets and a wide- ranging
commitment by Government to using trade and financial policies to steer resources to the HCI sector.
The motivation for the shift are: a) the need for deepening industrial structure reform,  b) the oil
shock of 1973-74 justified greater attention to import substitution.
The promotion of the HCI sector was supported by a broad range of policy instruments,
including import protection, fiscal preferences, interest subsidy, investment tax credit, allocation of
credit and policy loan. For instance, the National Investment Fund (NIF), established in 1974, lent as
much as two thirds of its portfolio to HCI projects.
Economic Stress Period (1979-1981)
Korea faced formidable problem in 1979: the structural and macroeconomics imbalances
created by the HCI drive were aggravated by the second oil crisis, the assassination of President Park
added great political uncertainty.
Functional Incentives and Liberalization (1980-90)
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Fifth Year Plan (1982-86)
In order to reverse a series of adverse events rocked the economy in 1979-81, the Fifth Year Plan
was lunched.  The Plan placed great emphasis on a program of stabilization and adjustment,
featuring conservative monetary and fiscal policies, exchange rate depreciation, and initiatives to
reduce the rate of growth of wages and the intensity of energy use.  On industrial policies,
Government reversed its past preferences toward large, heavy industry firms by reserving credit
for small and medium firms.  It terminated policies which awarded the HCI large-scale
preference.
Liberalizing Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio Foreign Investment
Internationalization of Korea’s capital market has been carried out cautiously since the
announcement of the long-term plan in 1981. Since 1984, limited indirect investment in Korean
stocks has been allocated through foreign investment funds, Korea Fund and Korea-Europe Fund.
Foreign securities companies were allowed to open representative offices. Korean began
liberalizing FDI in the early 1980s, and since 1985, the stock of FDI has more than doubled, from
$0.5 billion to 1.3 billion in 1988. Around a half of the direct investment has come from Japan.
Foreign Debt Crisis and Debt-Reduction Policy (1984-85)
Due to heavy borrowing to finance private sectors and heavy industries in the earlier 1970s,
Korean foreign debt reached more than half of its GDP by 1986, making Korea the fourth most
indebted among developing countries.  As a result, the government pursued an active debt-reduction
policy, by 1990, debt-GNP ratio was down to 14 percent.
High growth period (1986-88)
As a result of government efforts in stabilizing economy, the Korean economy grew at a remarkable
rate over this period, 12% in each of these three years. Real export growth averaging more than 20%
per year.  Main external factors behind high growth are low and stable oil price, the appreciation of
the Yen and strong growth of OECD countries (Korean main export markets).
Domestic financial reform
The favorable economic conditions from 1986-88— provided the ideal condition for liberalizing the
domestic financial system. It included privatization of the banking system, interest rate deregulation,
phasing out differences between policy loan and general loan, lowering of entry barriers to the
financial services industry.  In 1985 the banking sector was opened to allow foreign banks into the
domestic market on an equal footing with domestic banks and discriminatory laws against foreign
banks were removed. In 1987 foreign insurance companies were allowed access to the Korean
market (World Bank 1996).  On December 1988, Government announced plans to liberalize
domestic financial markets. Lending rate were decontrolled, monetary operation was shifted from
direct credit control to indirect credit control.
Financial Sector Liberalization (1987-)
Started at the end of 1980s,  foreign banks and insurance companies were allowed to enter
Korean market.  At the same time, international investment trusts were permitted, and foreign and
domestic securities companies were allowed to do business with each other.  This made possible
limited foreign ownership of Korean equities through the country funds.  The government permitted
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individual foreign securities companies to own up to 10 percent of the paid-in capital of large
domestic securities firms, provided that the total stake of foreign securities companies in a domestic
securities firm did not exceed 40 percent.  Under a guideline announced in November 1990 foreign
securities companies were allowed to establish branch offices or joint ventures in Korea. In 1989 and
1990, Government prepared for the imminent opening and expand foreigners’ indirect investment by
increasing the foreign investment funds. A matching fund, which will invest in both domestic and
foreign securities, was created in 1990. From January 1989, foreign securities companies were
entitled to increase their share in a domestic joint venture from 10 percent to a maximum of 40
percent on a global basis.
In 1992, Government announced plans to liberalize the capital account in several steps.
Starting January 1992, foreigners were allowed to invest directly in Korean stocks with certain limits,
and substantial overseas capital flowed into the Korean stock market.  In 1994, the Korean bond
market was opened to foreign investors on a limited basis: foreigners were allowed to invest in
nonguaranteed bonds of small-scale industries. Since February 1995 Koreans have been allowed to
hold foreign currencies without any restrictions, invest up to $300,000 in overseas real estate, and
deposit up to $30,000 in overseas banks.  In June 1993, the government announced a three stage
program for complete liberalization of financial, capital and foreign exchange market by 1998 (Table
3.1 in World Bank 1996).
Although Korea took several steps to liberalized its financial sector and capital account,
many internal and external factors triggered a severe financial crisis at the end of 1997.  The causes
of the crisis have been subject to heated debate, including, inter alia, a weak legal and regulatory
framework, regulatory forbearance and weak enforcement capacity, and excessive government
intervention to promote certain industries.   Nonetheless, the tremendous progress made by Korea in
economic reform and human development over the past 40 years cannot be ignored.
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Malaysia
History
Although the Malayan peninsula is located at the heart of where Buddhist and Hindu
influence intersect, since its beginning the country has been Islamic. Its recorded history starts
early in the XV century with the settlement on Malacca of the Sumatran prince Parameswara,
who adopted Islam and the title of Sultan Iskandar Shah. In 1511 Malacca was conquered by the
Portuguese. Later, the colonial ruler changes, in 1641 the Dutch takeover, and in 1795 the British
arrive. However all the colonial rulers had in common that they were more interested in trade
than in subjugating and converting. Thus, during the period different sultanates flourish. Chinese
presence in the peninsula had been irregular since the sixteenth century attracted by tin mines.
However, new tin mine discoveries in the XIX century, and later trading possibilities attracted a
steady flow of Chinese migration. Later, brought by the British Indian labor was imported at the
early stages of the next century. By the early 1900’s thanks to the introduction of the Brazilian
rubber tree, Malaysia had established itself as the world’s main supplier of tin rubber. However,
the Malays kept aside from this “modern” operations.
By the end of the Second World War, when the myth of British invincibility had been
destroyed, nationalism grew in the peninsula. Yet it was Malays nationalism, Chinese
nationalism, and Indian Nationalism acting as three separate forces. It took a special consensus of
moderate parties of the three ethnic group to form an Alliance Party that would give birth to the
federal nation of Malaysia in 1957. The social composition of the country was at the beginning,
roughly, one half Malays, one third Chinese, and one tenth Indian. There was an implicit social
contract at the beginning of the nation that gave the Malays the political monopoly, while the
Chinese controlled the industry and trade affairs. This order was violently brought to a halt with
riots in 1969. Extreme inequalities altered the peace of the country. By the late sixties a
peninsular Malays average income was one half of a Chinese. Changes had to be made.
Market Led Development 1957 - 1970
Since its independence the Malaysian economy has been very open. In 1960, exports
amounted to 55% of its GDP and import 42%. However, being essentially a primary commodities
exporter Malaysia was very sensitive to terms of trade shifts. The economy was led by an import
substitution strategy, but without protectionism. This may sound like an oxymoron, but the rate of
effective protection has been estimated in only 6% for the 1960’s. Public spending was focused in
agricultural and infrastructure projects, specially in the eastern part of the cuntry were Malays
were in a greater proportion. Import substitution was aimed at broadening the industrial base and
reducing the dependance of foreign consumer goods. During the 60’s GDP grew at an average
6% per year. Investement was low, at only 14% of GDP, but saving rates were twice as high. Low
investment rate may be explained by an overcautious enterpeneurial class, and fiscal prudence.
Even growth was not slow for developing country standards, there was an uneven distribution of
it, and unemployment lingered by the end of the decade at 7%.
State-Led Development, the NEP 1971-1985
After the 1969 riots, growth with equity became not only a desirable outcome, but the
only sustainable path. The answer was the New Economic Policy which had as socio political
goals the promotion of national unity, eliminating the identification of race with economic
function, by reducing poverty and making the Malays participate in the ownership of capital. To a
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certain extent the NEP was succesful, if in 1970 Malays owned 2.4 % of corporate equity, in 1990
this share had risen to 20.3; and the incidence of poverty fell from 46.4 to 17.1 during the  1976-
1990 period. These equity improvements were accompanied by an average GDP growth rate of
7%.
During this period the government changed its focus to an export oriented growth. Export
Processing Zones EPZ’s and Free Trade Zones FTZ’s with other tax breaks and subsidies acted as
effective export incentives. However these market inc were combined with strong public
intervention. The Industrial Coordination Act ICA imposed price regulation, licenses and quotas
all directed to the accomplishment of public goals. The discovery of rich fossil fuel deposits
together with increasing international prices for the resource helped national accounts, although it
caused some “Dutch disease”, appreciation the exchange rate. In the Agricultural sector there was
a shift from rubber to oil palm and cocoa production.
The second oil shock hit Malaysia. Inflation doubled to 9% in 1980. Investment that had
been funded mainly by national savings started to be increasingly covered with debt. External
debt grew from 9.5% of GNP in 1980 to 76% in 1986. Also, as the OECD countries adjusted to
the same shock, the terms of trade deteriorated. By the mid 80’s the ICA restrictions were
becoming an active constraint for the economy. In this context, recession hit the country, in 1985
the economy experienced a negative growth of GDP of 1% and almost 0 growth in 1986.
Adjustment and Liberalization 1986-1995
The recession obliged Malaysia to relax the strict controls of the NEP. The economy
recovered its high growth record, with an average GDP growth of 8% for the period, specially
boosted by direct foreign investment. By 1987 50% its investment was direct foreign investement
and it peaked to 70% in 1989.
Controls in the economy were reduced, for example exempting from ICA controls all
companies with a shareholders capital smaller than US$2.5 million. Also, policies that previously
had deterred foreign capitals like ethnic quotas in equity ownership were relaxed. At the same
time the Japanese had problems jump starting its economy after the recession and were looking
outward. Malaysia was succesful in attracting Japanese capital, not only because it opened in the
right time, but had social and macroeconomic stability to offer. Most of this direct foreign
investment was oriented to the more dynamic electronic and electric machinery industry.
By the late eighties, the ringgit had depreciated helping the export of manufactures, and
the foreign debt had been reduced. However during the 90’s foreign debt has been held steady at
nearly 40% of GDP, and their balance of payments shows a current account deficit that has been
growing to -8.5% of GDP in 1995.
The future challenges for the Malaysian economy as stated by its own government is to
transit to “productivity-driven growth”. This means that the country has to develop human
resources able to absorb and develop new technologies. Another challenge for Malaysia to
maintain its impressive growth record is to correct its deficits in its external accounts.  See World
Bank 1998 for recent events.
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Mexico
History
Mexico, in its early history, was a place for several civilizations including Olmecs, Mayas, and
Aztecs. The Spanish destroyed the Aztec empire and established in 1521 the colony of New Spain
on the land of Mexico and Central America. Three centuries later, Mexico declared independence
from Spain. Mexico later suffered from the predatory incursions from the United States of
America. In 1835, Texas ceded from Mexico and was annexed to the USA in 1845. War break
out between the USA and Mexico. At the end, Mexico lost not only Texas, but also California,
Arizona, and New Mexico. Anti-US sentiment remained strong and only recently it has subsided
to a lower level following closer economic relations between the two countries.
Rapid Growth (1958-1970s)
The growth rate of the Mexican GDP was maintained at 6.85% from 1958 to 1970, which also
meant a 3.2% growth rate of the per capita GDP while the population was growing at an average
rate of 3.5%. The Cuban revolution in 1960 fueled the political instability in Mexico. Discovery
of the massive Chiapas oil field in 1970 and the oil price surge in the world market over 1973-74
brought economic prosperity into Mexico and relieved the social tension.
Cumulating of External Debt (1976-1982)
Mexico attracted massive capital inflow following the oil boom. International capital flew into the
country and Mexico cumulated huge external debt over 1976-82. The government also pursued a
policy of high public spending for high growth rate and for income re-distribution. Even though
Mexico increased export both by huge volume and by value, the foreign exchanges earned from
the export were wasted quickly by the policies of defending the overvalued Peso and maintaining
the high level of public expenditures. There was massive capital flight. At the end of 1982, the
foreign exchange reserve left could not afford to pay for the import of three weeks.
Debt Crisis and Retrenchment (1982-1988)
The fortune of oil boom was brought into an abrupt end when the Latin American debt crisis
erupted in 1982. In 1986 the world oil prices collapsed, and decreased the revenue earned from
oil export. Mexico is under heavy pressure to tackle the problem of inflation. In December 1987,
the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica (PSE), an anti-inflation plan, was agreed among the
government, the labor unions, and the business organizations. It fixed prices, wages, and the
exchange rate, and it reduced tariff rates. Those stabilization measures reduced the inflation rate
from 157% in 1987 to 52% in 1988. During the retrenchment from 1983 to 1988, the economic
growth was less than 0.1%. Investment suffered the most, decreasing by an annual rate of 4.3%.
The public investment fell by more than 11% annually.
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Salinas’ Recovery Plan: Half Fallacy (1989-1994)
Carlos Salinas took the office on December 1, 1988. In May 1989, his government unveiled the
national development plan for 1989-94. It has two major objectives: promoting economic growth
at a rate of 6% and keeping the inflation rate comparable to its major trading partners. The
strategy relied on two measures: (1) maintaining economic stability by a predetermined nominal
exchange rate anchor supported by restrained fiscal and monetary policy, and (2) promoting
domestic and foreign private investment by aggressive structural reforms including price and
trade liberalization, privatization, financial sector liberalization, deregulation, and tax reform. The
exchange rate policy led to an overvalued peso, and the current account would grow and had to be
financed by the foreign capital inflow. This plan became the hostage of foreign capital movement.
It appeared to be working at the early stage. Inflation fell to 8% by 1993, GDP growth rate
reached 4% over 1989 to 1991. Foreign capital inflow surged and covered the growing current
account deficit. In 1993, Mexico got $29 billion net capital inflow which raised the reserve by $6
billion after covering the $23 billion current account deficit. But the capital inflow was used for
consumption instead of investment. The reforms could not go far enough without the
complementary reforms in labor market, legal system, and financial market. Productivity simply
did not grow at a high speed. Current account deficit became larger and larger, from 3% of GDP
in 1989-90 to 7% of GDP in  1992-94. In 1994, net capital inflow drop to only $10 billion, and
current account deficit increased to $29 billion. This caused the reserve to drop by $19 billion.
The Mexico Crisis and the Rescue Coming from the US and the IMF (1994-)
The investors began to loss their confidence and capital inflow slowed down. In reaction, the
Mexican government first shifted the composition of domestic public debt from peso-
denominated securities to dollar-indexed securities and maintained a rigid exchange rate. This
policy quickly drained the reserve of foreign exchanges. Zedillo government took the office on
December 1, 1994, and his government was forced to relax the band of exchange rate on
December 20, 1994. With only $6 billion reserve left on December 22, which could not afford a
month of imports, the government floated the peso. As soon as the peso floated, the investor’s
confidence collapsed. The peso’s value was on a free fall, and market volatility continued through
February 1995.
On March 9, 1995, the government come up with a stabilization program which was also backed
by a $50 billion international financial assistant package, including $20 from the US and SDR
12.1 from the IMF.  The program achieved substantial results.
Two additional events had possibly contributed to the 1994 Mexican Crisis. (1) The peasants
uprising in the poor southern state Chiapas send a signal of political instability and fueled the
uncertainty of the investment. (2) Mexico joined the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1992. Once the NAFTA come into force on January 1, 1994, the Mexican economy
got subject to the influence of the economic performance of the US. When the interest rose in the
US, the investment in Mexico was made less attractive and capital began flow out of Mexico. The
$20 billion financial assistant from the US was a reward from the US in return for Mexico’s
weakening hostility.
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Peru
A Glorious Ancient History
Peru is the birthplace of the Inca Empire, one of the most important ancient civilization centers
both in the pre-Hispanic Americas and in the World. The Spanish conqueror, Francisco Pizarro,
arrived in 1532. Forty years after, the Inca Empire was finally defeated in 1572. Then the Spanish
colonized Peru for more than two centuries. Peru declared independence from Spain in 1821.
During the War of the Pacific over 1879-83, both Peru and Bolivia lost lands to Chile, and the
mutual distrust among them remains toady.
Economic Experiments (1950s-1990)
Peru has abundant natural resources, including mineral, fishing, hydrocarbon and human capital.
Mining is import for balance of payment, which accounted for half of export.
Peru tried all kinds of economic polices for its development, first the laissez-faire policy in 1950s,
and then import substitution and nationalization in 1960s and early 1970s. The rule of
dictatorship dominated Peruvian politics. A democratic government led by President Fernando
Belaunde Terry was elected and then overthrown by a coup in 1968. From 1968 to 1975, the
military government started land reform and nationalized industries. Spending and foreign
borrowing spiraled out of control. A bloodless coup installed another military regime and
continued control till 1980. In the 1980 democratic election, Fernando Belaunde Terry was
elected for his second term as the President. He started to reform the economy, but the debt crisis
of 1982 forced the reforms into a pause. Garcia took the office in July 1985. Over 1985-90, Peru
retreated to protectionism. Garcia promised to achieve high economic growth rate and to increase
the living standard of the poor. He announced radical policies. He devalued the currency, raised
wages, The unorthodox economic policy only led to short-lived growth in 1986-87 and then
caused hyper-inflation. In 1987, the ill-judged move to nationalize banking system provoked
protest and rallied opposition, over 1988-90 the economy contracted sharply. By 1990, the
economy was on the verge of economic collapse. Rampant and terrorism grew out of the poor
economic performance during the 1980s.
Fujimori’s Reform (1990-1997)
After taking office in July 1990, Albert Fujimori pursued a bold reform agenda, moved the
Peruvian economic onto a right track. (1) When price control was eliminated in August 1990,
price rose 500% overnight and then inflation dropped several months later. (2) Public spending
was cut through down-sizing the public sector. (3) Tight monetary policy under the term of he
1993 IMF agreement required informal currency fully backed by foreign reserves. (4)
Privatization and investment promotion to finance economic development. (5) Tax reform led to
tax collection from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 13.9% of  GDP in 1995. In 1995, Albert Fujimori was
elected for the second term.
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The Philippines
History
In 1521, the Spanish expedition led by Ferdinand Magellan reached the Philippines. Forty years
later, European settlers come for the purpose religious conversion, with little resistance from the
local Malay people. At the beginning of the 19th century, the European settlers engaged in
economic activities. The Chinese entrepreneurial class formed the elite based on land ownership.
In 1896 the local people mounted a rebellion against Spain. After the US intervention, Spain
ceded the Philippines to the USA in 1898. The struggle for independence continued against the
US. The Filipino-American War (1899-1902) ended with the imposition of the US colonial rule,
and semi-colonial control after 1935. Both English education and democratic institutions were
introduced into this country. The planned independence of 1946 was interrupted by Japanese
invasion in December 1941. The US forces under the leadership of General MacArthur liberated
the land during the World War II. The Philippines gained its full independence on schedule in
1946.
Close Tie with the US (1946-1974)
The newly independent republic maintained preferential economic relations with the USA. Under
the Laurel Langley Agreement, certain quota of goods was allowed duty-free access to the US
market until 1954 and the tariffs gradually moved up to full scale by 1974. The parity for US
citizen also continued until 1974. Two major US military bases, the Clark Field air base and the
Subic Bay naval base were stationed in the Philippines until 1991-92. Like the political system in
the US, power was alternated between two parties, the Nationalists and the Liberals.
Marcos Autocracy (1967-72-83-86)
In September 1972, the peaceful transition of power was interrupted. Ferdinand Marcos, who was
at the end of its second term as the president, imposed martial law by citing the threat of
“subversive forces.” From 1972 to 1986, the Philippines experienced “constitutional
authoritarianism.” Marcos succeeded in all the following elections both through manipulating the
media and through cheating the polls. In August 1983, the political situation changed when the
strongest opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, returned to the country from the US. Mr. Aquino
was assassinated minutes after he landed at the airport under military escort. People including the
business community took the street and mounted massive demonstrations. Capital flight that
followed the political turmoil hurt the economy. Under the pressure from Washington, Marcos
called an early election in 1986. This time he lost to Mrs. Aquino, the widow of Mr. Benigno
Aquino.
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Political Transition, Shocks,  and Beginning of Reforms (1986-1992)
A series of coup attempts clouded the Aquino government. The first military coup saw in July
1987, and the last and most nearly successful one in December 1989. No more coup attempts
after the year of 1989 during which Marcos died in Hawaii. While making political efforts for
stability, the Aquino government maintained a high spending program and high wage to buy
social stability. The recovery over 1986-87 was a consumption-led growth. The coconut price
increase in the world market also helped the economy. Unfortunately, several domestic and
international events slowed down the growth over 1988-90. First the drought in Luzon hurt power
supply; second the Persian Gulf crisis following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1989 led
to sharp increase of oil price, and this in turn worsened the term of trade of the Philippines; third
the military coup in December 1989.
During the turmoil of 1980s, both political and economic, external debt was cumulated,  and both
investment and saving were discouraged. To attract international capital and promote private
investment, the Aquino government started economic reforms, mainly through privatization. In
June 1989, 30 percent of the equity of the Philippine National Bank was privatized. In June 1991,
the Foreign Investment Act allows 100% foreign equity ownership except in restricted sectors.
Economic Reform along with Political Stability (1992-1997)
In May 1992, Aquino peacefully transferred through election the power to the next president
Fidel Ramos. Ramos expanded economic liberalization while continuing the privatization
program. In August 1992, the exchange control was lifted on virtually all current-account
transactions. In February 1993, the telecommunication monopoly was ended. In 1994, 60 percent
of the equity of the state owned refinery was privatized, and the ban on entry of foreign bank
branches was lifted. In 1995, aviation services opened up for private involvement, and 100
percent foreign equity was allowed in mining in exchange for technology and investment. In
1996, maximum tariff was cut from 50 percent to 30 percent.  All those structural reforms created
an environment of attracting investment and promoted export. The economic growth in 1990s
was characterized by export promotion, investment attraction, and private sector participation.
Other Factors
(1) The Philippines has wide range of  diversified resources, physical and human. However, the
economic performance has not reached its potential. The social and economic inequality is the
major obstacle for its economic development. With respect to geographic disparity, the National
Capital region (NCR) centered on Manila, accounts 13 percent of population and produces 30
percent of GDP. As for the income inequality, the richest 20 percent of the population have an
income 10.7 times that of the poorest 20 percent. (2) The remittance from Filipinos overseas
accounts for 2.2 to 4.5 percent of the GDP, and it was a important factor for economic growth.
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Thailand
History
The first unified Thai kingdom was found at Sukhothai in the northern part of the Central Plain
on the Indochinese peninsula. The Thai kingdom flourished in the 13 century and expanded its
territory down the Chao Phraya valley to the City of Ayuthaya. From this city, the Thai kingdom
extended its hegemony southward to the place where is now the modern Malaysia and eastward
to the Khmer Empire. During the 19th century, the European powers expanded their colonial
control to Asia. Even though the boundary of Thailand was reduced by the French encroachment
in Laos and Cambodia and by the British influence in the Malay states, Thailand maintained the
political independence by taking advantage of the rivalry between Britain and France. In the
economic terms, however, Thailand was colonized. The British controlled the exploration of the
major commodities including rice, rubber, tin and teak. The economic penetration created new
interest groups in the Thai society and caused conflicts, and further led to political changes. In
1932, the monarchy was overthrown and a constitutional monarchy was set up and this political
structure continues to the present time. Nevertheless, the monarchy plays an important role as a
stabilizing force in the domestic politics.
Natural Resource Based Exports (1950s-1960s)
Till 1973, most of the time Thailand was under the control of military government. The military
government undertook a “state capitalism” program for economic development during the 1950s.
The Board of Investment (BOI) was established in 1959 to stimulate both domestic and foreign
investment with high protection barriers. In the 1960s, the BOI encouraged the development of an
industrial sector based on import substitution. And it also concentrated on infrastructure, such as
roads, power stations, and irrigation projects, which opened up the large areas of new agricultural
lands for crop cultivation.
Oil Shocks, Export Diversification, and Import Substitution (1970s)
During the 1970s, Thailand increased its tariff in favor of Import substitution and kept searching
for the market for its crops (such as cassava, sugarcane, and pineapples), textiles, and garments.
Helped by the export diversification, Thailand managed to minimize the damage of the first oil
shock over 1973-74. However, the current account worsened and the budget deficit grew, which
signaled the structural problem of the Thai economy.
In 1973, an uprising engineered by students removed the military strongmen from the
government. Even though a bloody coup in 1976 restored military to power the military
involvement in government was limited to power-sharing with the civilians.
Even though the discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand helped to relieve the pressure of
energy cost after the second oil shock over 1979-80. The second oil shock intensified the
structural problem of the economy. At the same time, the world was in economic recession, and
the world commodity price decreased. The import substitution strategy reached it limits.
Slow Structural Adjustment (1979-1984)
Realizing the limitation of the import substitution strategy, the Thai government unilaterally
started a World Bank style structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1980. In return, the World
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Bank agreed to a series of unconditional structural adjustment loans to Thailand two years later.
The Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1981/82-1985/86) embodied this program. However the
reform was slow for the economy was still in a sound condition, with price distortion not that
serious comparing to other developing countries and with capital inflows from other private and
official sources being big enough to cover the growing foreign debt.
Recession and Export Promotion (1985-1995)
The recession over 1984-85 accelerated the process of reforms. The government devalued the
currency in November 1984 and started a far more vigorous export promotion policy.
Tariffs were lowed and made more uniform, notably the rice and energy prices were brought into
line with the market levels. The budget ran surplus after 1988 till 1996.
In 1988, a democratic government was elected through general election. Unfortunately,
factionalism and corruption in the civilian government led to another military coup in February
1991. When the pro-military party tried to back the former army command-in-chief, Suchinda, as
the premier, people took the street and the bloody clash happened. After the intervention from the
King, Suchinda stepped down and a fresh election was held in September 1992.
Thailand continued its reform in the area of financial deregulation. In 1993, the Bangkok
International Banking Facility (BIBF) was established for easy access to funds. This and many
other factors led to accumulation of huge debt, concentrated in the financial firms and banks, and
finally triggered off the 1997 economic crisis. The crisis now spread across Southeast Asia and
causes uncertainty for the world economy.  See World Bank 1998 for financial crisis after 1997.
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Venezuela
History
The Carib and Arawak Amerindian tribes lived on the territory of Venezuela before the Spanish
colonized this land in the 16th century. Christopher Columbus sighted Venezuela in his third trip
to the Americas in 1498. Then the Spanish colonized Venezuela for about three centuries. After a
protracted war led by Simon Bolivar, the hero of Latin American history, Venezuela declared
independence from Spain in 1819. Venezuela first joint Colombia and Ecuador to form the
Republic of Gran Colombia, and then ceded from the republic and become an independent
country in 1830. After one century of rule of dictatorship, democratic government was briefly
introduced starting from 1935. Military coup by General Pérez Jiménez restored military control
in 1948, which was then destroyed in 1958. Civilian rule has been established since then and
Venezuela even served as the model of stability and progress for the rest of Latin America for a
period of time.
Oil Shocks and Debt Crisis: Fortune and Misfortune (1970s-1988)
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Venezuela has rich natural resources, and petroleum has been a pillar for the Venezuelan
economy since the 1920s. Oil has brought fortune to Venezuela but poor management has led
Venezuela into crisis. When the price of oil soared in the world market over 1973-74, the
government nationalized the petroleum firms, used the revenue for an ambitious development
program, and invested in hydroelectric power and other no-oil industries. The inward looking
policy under highly rigid central government control caused the poor performance of the
economy. Mismanagement wasted the benefits of the oil boom. The economy stalled in 1978 and
the government was accused of corruption. Facing the deteriorated economic situation, the
government responded by further tightening controls on prices, foreign exchange, and credit
allocations. This resulted in a low competitiveness of non-oil sectors. Public accounts had to
continue its dependence on oil export, and thus they were highly sensitive to external shocks. The
second oil price increase over 1979-80 only helped the economy at a margin. When the Latin
American debt crisis erupted in August 1982, massive capital flight and closure of international
capital markets led to a foreign exchange crisis in Venezuela in 1983. The Venezuelan economy
was in declining from 1979 to 1985. The per capita GNP in 1985 was 19 percent lower than the
level of 1972. In 1986 the world oil prices collapsed, the revenue earned from oil export shrank,
the government needed funds to sustain the economic development. Still being reluctant to reform
the economic system, the government pursued an expansionary policy from 1986 to 1988, which
only pushed up the growth temporarily. The negative effects quickly overshadowed the short-
term gain. Deficit gap widened up and cumulated the pressure for inflation. By the end of 1988,
the country’s international reserves almost exhausted, and the government had to reform the
economy.
Reforms and Risks (1989-1995)
A new government that took office in February 1989 started far-reaching reforms. Both the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank joined the efforts. An orthodox
stabilization plan was introduced to maintain external and internal balances, and a structural
reform program was embarked upon with the aim of creating a condition for sustainable
economic development based on non-oil exports. The reform was backed by a loan of Extended
Fund Facility worth of SDR3.7 billion (Special Drawing Rights) from the IMF and a series of
quick-disbursing policy loans from the World Bank. With widespread shortage of basic food
items, the domestic political environment was very risky. When the retail gasoline price doubled
from about $.12 to $.24 per gallon, the bus divers doubled their fares even though the gasoline
price change only increased their cost by 10 percent. This spurred widespread riots, more than
300 people died. The government was determined to implement the reforms despite the risks of
temporary instability.  As a precaution the fuel price reform was slowed down.
The reforms included the following major aspects: dismantling government agencies that used to
control the allocation of economic resources, moving from government fixed foreign exchange
rate and interest rate to market-determined systems, moving from high and variable tariffs to low
and more uniform tariffs. Several public firms, most notable one being the telecommunication
company, were privatized. In 1990, Venezuela also negotiated debt re-structuring agreement with
the commercial bank creditors under the initiative of the Brady Plan, which is named after then
US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. The reforms achieved several positive results. The
government reduced fiscal deficit from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1988 to 1.4 percent of GDP in 1989
and obtained fiscal surplus of 1.1 percent and 0.7 percent of GDP in 1990 and 1991 respectively.
The shock of the major adjustments required by the reforms caused a temporary recession in
1989, GDP fell by 8.6 percent. Then the GDP grow at an average rate of 7.4 percent a year from
1990 to 1992. The 1989 recession helped the decrease of import, and the international reserves
increased by revenue of non-oil exports, this made the balance of payment back into surplus right
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in the year of 1989. Sharply increased oil export during the Gulf crisis also helped Venezuela to
gain a massive current account surplus and a $4.4 billion surplus of international reserves in
1990. Buoyant oil revenue was fed into spending plan. Similar to the GDP growth pattern, the
investment fell 53 percent in 1989, and a further 8 percent in 1990, then rose 81 percent in 1991
and further 37 percent in 1992.
In 1992, two military coups were organized against the government. The military coups did not
succeed, but they put the reforms into a pause. The government had to increase spending to buy
stability. Unfortunately, oil price declined after the Persian Gulf war and consequently the
revenue from oil exports was decreased. These factors led to a fiscal crisis in 1992. Not until
March 1994, a reform program--the Sosa plan--was created and implemented, and this plan
successfully increased non-oil revenue through tax measures. However the 1994-95 banking
crisis ruined the achievement of the Sosa plan. The cost of intervention was more than 12% of
GDP. Public expenditure remained high. In 1995, the government started negotiations with the
IMF for a stand-by loan agreement.
Agenda Venezuela (1996)
The Agenda Venezuela, a new stabilization plan, was announced in April of 1996. The IMF
endorsed a $1.4 billion stand-by loan agreement. This plan courageously introduced a fivefold
increase of fuel price, increased the luxury and wholesale goods tax (LWT) from 12% to 16.5%,
removed controls on exchange, interest rate, and most price, and floated the exchange rate. A
relatively high monthly inflation rate of 12.6% occurred in May, and then the inflation rate
dropped to 3% at the end of the 1996. Both the volume and the price increase of oil exports also
increased revenue. The government altered its fiscal account deficit of 8% of GDP in 1995 to a
healthy surplus in 1996. The economic performance boosted confidence of investors, as a result,
buoyant international capital flow into Venezuela. The government obtained so large amount of
international reserves that it decided not to use the second trench of the IMF loan after receiving
the first $500 million.
Remained Issues
A successful reform requires the government to minimize the impact of oil price shocks on the
economy. (1) In order to cut the public expenditures, the government has to streamline the staff in
the civil service where 1.3 million people are employed. This is also a troublesome political issue.
(2) Under the term of the IMF agreement, the Venezuelan government is obligated to set aside the
surplus oil revenue, when the oil price received by the state oil producer, Petréleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), exceeds $14.7 per barrel. The surplus oil revenue will be put into two accounts: a debt
rescue fund and a macroeconomics stabilization fund. The debt rescue fund is used for clearing
overdue internal and external debt and for prepaying outstanding external liability. The
stabilization fund first collects money while the oil price is high and then finances the
government budget when the oil price drops to low levels. (3) Venezuela’s public expenditure on
education has been managed poorly, which is extremely biased toward high education, more than
50% for universities and only 47% used for the primary and secondary education. Only one third
of the student population continue education beyond the 9th grade due to a high school dropout
rate.
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